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Abstract
This dissertation contains two chapters that study topics on the intersection of the
consumer credit and labor markets. Below are the individual abstracts.
Chapter 1: Does Paycheck Frequency Matter? Evidence from Micro Data
Paycheck frequency is a salient labor income characteristic to which all work-
ers are exposed. Using a unique dataset from an online account aggregator, we
study whether paycheck frequency affects household financial outcomes. Looking
at cross-sectional differences and within-household changes to paycheck frequency,
we find that higher paycheck frequency results in less credit card borrowing yet
more instances of financial distress. Moreover, we find that the timing of distress is
strongly driven by the paycycle. Our model shows that higher paycheck frequency
increases the liquidity available to households, increasing the willingness to allo-
cate to illiquid savings, reducing consumption and within-paycycle borrowing.
Chapter 2: Is Corporate Credit Risk Propagated to Employees?
Using an administrative credit registry for individuals merged with matched
employer-employee data, we investigate whether a firm’s credit risk affects its em-
ployees’ access to credit. We find that employees of companies that suffer credit
rating downgrades have access to 20 percent less credit and face 10 percent higher
interest rates compared with similar employees of non-downgraded firms. Work-
ers from downgraded firms are also 5 p.p. more likely to default on loans than
employees from unaffected firms. These adverse financial effects have real conse-
quences, with employees cutting consumption by 9 percent following downgrades
of their employers. Our results suggest that banks process information on the fi-
nancial health of employers when pricing consumer credit.
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Chapter 1
Does Paycheck Frequency Matter? Evidence
from Micro Data
1.1 Introduction
Does the frequency of paycheck receipt matter to households? Recent technologi-
cal advances have facilitated the increasing of pay frequency, enabling households
to be paid as often as daily.1 Absent behavioral biases and heuristics, however,
these small differences in the timing of pay should not matter. In this paper we
investigate whether differences in pay frequency affects household outcomes such
as consumer debt and the likelihood of financial distress. If the timing of pay in-
deed matters, it will have far-reaching consequences to households, employers, and
policymakers alike.
We begin by developing a theoretical framework which produces empirically
testable hypotheses. To do so, we extend the model of Parsons and Van Wesep
(2013), who conclude that impatient households are better off when the timing of
their pay aligns with the timing of their expenditures. We build upon their model
by introducing two additional features to their model: costless within-paycycle
borrowing (e.g. credit cards which are paid in full) and an illiquid savings vehicle
(e.g. retirement savings).
Our model predicts that higher paycheck frequency results in lower within-paycycle
borrowing. The model highlights that liquidity is the underlying mechanism –
higher paycheck frequency effectively creates more liquidity than lower paycheck
frequency. Since more frequently paid households receive more liquidity from their
paychecks, they are more willing to save in illiquid savings vehicles. This results
in lower consumption and lower within-paycycle borrowing. In contrast, since less
frequently paid households receive less liquidity through their paychecks, they are
1The Wait for Payday Doesn’t Have to Be So Long, the Wall Street Journal, Aug 10, 2019;
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-wait-for-payday-doesnt-have-to-be-so-long-11565429401
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less willing to save in illiquid savings vehicles. This results in higher consumption
and higher within-paycycle borrowing.
Further, since less frequently paid households receive larger paychecks, they are
better positioned to deal with unexpected expenses within-paycycle. For example,
if an unexpected expense arose immediately after receiving a large paycheck, a
monthly-paid household would have the remainder of the month to adjust con-
sumption to deal with this fact. Consequently, we predict that less (more) fre-
quently paid households will exhibit fewer (more) instances of financial distress.
We empirically test these predictions using micro data of more than 183,000
households from an online account aggregator. This dataset is particularly well
suited to help us answer the question of whether paycheck frequency matters to
households since it allows us to precisely identify each household as receiving
income on a weekly, semi-monthly, or monthly basis and whether their pay fre-
quency changes over time. Further, we’re able to directly observe the borrowing
and financial distress patterns of each household – both within-paycycle and over
longer periods of time.
We begin our empirical analysis by investigating cross-sectional differences in
household outcomes across different pay frequency cohorts. Consistent with our
theoretical predictions, we find that more frequently paid households borrow less
and experience more financial distress than households that are paid less fre-
quently.
To rule out the possibility that our results are driven by systematic differences
in the types of individuals who receive pay at each frequency, we perform sev-
eral additional tests. First, we show that variables likely to be correlated with
borrowing and distress, such as income, are similar across pay frequency cohorts.
Consequently, our results are robust to the inclusion of income controls. Second,
we exploit within-household changes to pay frequency – both frequency increases
and frequency decreases. Consistent with our theoretical predictions and cross-
sectional findings, we find that increases (decreases) in pay frequency are followed
by households borrowing less (more).
To our knowledge, our paper is the first to empirically test the effects of paycheck
frequency on debt and distress. Our findings are consistent with the theoretical
predictions of Parsons and Van Wesep (2013), yet inconsistent with the predictions
of the neoclassical literature. For example, seminal papers by Friedman (1957)
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and Hall (1978) and theory built upon theirs have shown that “consumers should
choose current consumption after considering the state of resources available to
them over their entire lifetime,” known as the life-cycle permanent income hypoth-
esis. Under this hypothesis, neither a transitory change in income level or a change
to the timing of income should have any effect on household decision making, as-
suming that neither of these changes has an effect on the household’s permanent
income.
Recent studies, however, have challenged the Friedmanesque permanent income
view. Berniell (2018) exploits exogenous variation in pay frequency of retired cou-
ples to show that individuals who are paid more frequently have smoother con-
sumption paths. Additionally, using cross-sectional variation in state labor laws,
she shows that income cycles generate aggregate business cycles in sectors with
costly congestion. Zhang (2017) uses the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the
slight difference between payment schedules of bi-weekly versus semi-monthly fre-
quency as an identification strategy to test for consumption responses. The result
that bi-weekly paid consumers exhibit excessive sensitivity to the third bi-weekly
paycheck in the special months with three paychecks. Both of these studies focus
primarily on consumption and spending outcomes rather than debt utilization and
financial distress.
The literature documents the relation between income timing and household
financial decisions by relying on event studies or well-identified differences in in-
come timing. Gelman et al. (2014) document spending responses to income re-
ceipt, especially among individuals with less liquidity, in a paper focusing on the
validation of account aggregation services as a source of data to study individual
behavior. Gelman et al. (2018) use the 2013 U.S. Federal Government shutdown
episode as an exogenous shock leading to a delay in income receipt. Even though
this delayed income was paid to each worker within two weeks, they show that
spending exhibited a sharp drop. Households adjust by delaying recurring pay-
ments, and this transitory income timing shock revealed long term consequences,
such as higher levels of debt months after the shock. Consistent with this work,
Baker and Yannelis (2017) find excess sensitivity of consumption patterns. They
document an increase in home production through a decrease in restaurant con-
sumption, matched with an increase in groceries shopping, consistent with affected
workers cutting spending to maintain similar “consumption.”
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Still related to excess sensitivity in spending, Aydin (2021) uses a randomized
control trial in which credit availability (or liquidity), rather than income, is de-
layed. He documents a marginal propensity to consume out of credit of 0.12 after
three months not associated with any effect on delinquency. ? estimate responses
to the 2001 federal income tax rebates, paid out to households over a ten-week
period with random assignment based on the last digit of Social Security num-
bers. They observe a significant increase in spending for nondurable goods, and
document that in the three-month window subsequent to the rebate, an average
of two-thirds of the rebate is spent. Using the same event and a panel dataset of
credit cards, Agarwal et al. (2007), study not only spending responses, but also the
debt responses of households. They find that consumers initially saved a fraction
of their rebate through the repayment of their credit cards. However, spending
subsequently increased, particularly among the most liquidity constrained house-
holds.
The closest empirical work to our paper is Baugh et al. (2018b), who study how
financial outcomes such as financial distress and credit card utilization are influ-
enced by the timing of pay. In their study, they exploit the fact that Social Security
recipients are quasi-randomly assigned to receive their paychecks on the second,
third, or fourth Wednesday of each month. This scheduling of pay results in pay
cycles that are either four or five weeks between payments, depending on the given
month, yet the size of the payment is constant across months. Further, they exploit
the fact that these groups have pay timing yet similar due dates of recurring bills
(e.g. mortgages tend to be due on the first of the month). These two artifacts lead
to higher likelihood of financial shortfalls in longer paycycles (i.e. 5-week cycles
vs 4-week cycles) and for households with higher distances between the timing of
income and their bills.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2 we present the theoretical model
and its corresponding predictions. In Section 1.3 we describe the data and empirical
specifications. In Section 1.4 we present our cross-sectional results. In Section 1.5




The foundation of our model is that of Parsons and Van Wesep (2013) who analyze
the optimal timing of pay in the presence of present-biased employees. While their
paper considers decision of both the firm and the employee, our paper focuses
entirely on the employee side of the model. In this subsection, we restate the
employee side of their model, which serves as the foundation for our expanded
model which we present in the following subsection.
A T-period labor contract is divided in paycycles of F periods, in which every F
periods a salary of Fw (a wage per period, w, times F periods) is received by the
agent. Therefore, a monthly paid agent will have F = 28 and a weekly paid agent
will have F = 7. The agent has δ− β utility, with δ set to 1, as it does not change
the results and strongly simplifies the algebraic form of the solution. β is a present
bias parameter - the lower it is, the heavier the penalty for future utility. We focus
in the case in which the agent has constant relative risk aversion log-utility.








where ct is the consumption level the consumer is choosing upon in period t, and
the sequence {c∗k}k=(t+1),...,T are future consumption levels, assuming the principle
of optimality (i.e. in each future period, the agent will maximize her utility in that
period solving the same problem in (1)). lt is the available liquidity in time t and
reflects liquid savings from previous periods.
The consumer’s marginal utility in the period preceding a paycheck is greater
than the consumer’s marginal utility in the period following a paycheck. Note that
because of present bias, the agent will have a descending consumption path and
hence c∗1 > c
∗
F.
2 This reduces the problem from one T-period horizon problem to
T/F problems with F-period horizon that can be solved separately, because the
2This leads to a corner solution of the Hyperbolic Euler Relation from Harris and Laibson (2001),
as indicated in the proof of Proposition 2 of Parsons and Van Wesep (2013) It will then be optimal
for the present-biased consumer to spend all her resources before paycheck arrival.
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cycle will repeat itself. The optimal solution is:
c∗i = Ai × wF
A1 =
1
1 + (F− 1)β
Ai =
1






1 + (F− j)β
]
for i ∈ {2, 3, ..., F}
(1.2)
As is common for the case of log-utility, consumption can be written as a sep-
arable fraction of the initial available resources, here Fw. We can confirm that
consumption levels are decreasing with time, within the paycycle:
At+1/At =











] = (F− t)β
(1− β) + (F− t)β < 1 (1.3)
It is worth reiterating that this model is a representation of intra-paycyle con-
sumption choices in steady-state. By steady-state, we understand that there are no
stochastic or anticipated perturbations to such an equilibrium and that it can be
repeated an indefinite number of times.
1.2.2 Extended Setting
In the preceding section, we can see that the liquid holdings of the agent will be
depleted to zero at the end of each paycycle. Immediately after her wage is paid,
her liquid holdings will be Fw. In our first adaptation to the baseline Parsons and
Van Wesep (2013) model, we introduce within-paycycle borrowing.
Specifically, we introduce a costless within-paycycle borrowing mechanism, such
as a credit card, that does not accrue interest if it is repaid in full. Consequently,
when the agent is paid her wage, Fw, a fraction of the wage will be used to pay
the balance of the last pay period. We denote that fraction as α. Therefore, after
making the payment of αFw on her payday, the consumer begins her pay period
with (1− α)Fw in cash. Despite only having (1− α)Fw in cash at the beginning
of the pay period, the consumer can still spend the full Fw in that paycycle after
borrowing αFw.
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Proposition 1. In the presence of within-paycycle borrowing, an agent’s con-
sumption path is unchanged. Further, the amount she borrows and consumes is
independent of her pay frequency.
Proof. Because the agent consumes Fw regardless of her level of borrowing, we
know that the agent’s consumption path is independent of α. Therefore, α describes
the initial condition of the agent’s indebtedness. If α = 0, the consumer has no
debt so all her consumption is paid using her paycheck. If α = 1, the consumer
will use her entire paycheck to pay previously contracted debt. In this case, all of
her consumption will be paid using this costless liquidity source. Cases like α > 1
will resemble the same within-paycycle situation as α = 1; the only difference is the
previously accumulated stock of debt that will never be paid should this steady-
state continue forever.
While liquidity is typically defined as how easily assets can be converted into
cash, wage liquidity in our setting represents how quickly the wage takes to reach
the household’s account. Thus, differences in paycheck frequency across groups
can be viewed as differences in the liquidity of each group’s wage.
In our baseline model, households save by consuming less than their income.
These savings are held in a liquid savings account that is costlessly accessed in the
future. Let us now consider the case in which there is also an illiquid long-term
savings instrument where any amount allocated to this instrument is inaccessible
within the paycycle. Examples of this illiquid long-term savings instrument are
contributions to retirement accounts or the voluntary prepayment of a mortgage.
With the introduction of this feature into the model, the first day of each paycycle
the consumer will choose her consumption path, {ct} and how much to allocate
to this savings instrument, s per day, or Fs per paycycle. This amount is deducted
immediately from her paycheck, and so the amount she may consume decreases







log(c∗k) + βφV(Fs) (1.4)
where φ is an extra discount factor for the fact that the proceeds from these savings
will only benefit the consumer in a distant future and V(.) is a concave utility
function of the savings proceeds. The form with which the consumer derives utility
from illiquid savings is consistent with what is done in Kuchler et al. (2013).
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Taking s as given, and noting that the last term does not directly depend on any
consumption level, the solution is similar to the baseline solution but with F(w− s)
being partitioned across periods instead of Fw:
c∗i = Ai × F(w− s)
A1 =
1
1 + (F− 1)β
Ai =
1






1 + (F− j)β
]
for i ∈ {2, 3, ..., F}
(1.5)
We assume V(.) to take the form of a logarithm, and given the choice of the
optimal consumption path, the agent can choose s to maximize utility.
max
s




log(AkF(w− s)) + βφ log(Fs) (1.6)
The First Order Condition implies:




= 0⇒ s∗ =
[
βφ







1 + (F− 1 + φ)β
(1.7)
As shown above, the choice of illiquid savings depends only on the present bias
parameter, the long-term illiquidity discount, wage rate, and paycheck frequency.
The last equivalence shows an expression for the optimal illiquid savings rate. This
yields a set of predictions regarding intra-cycle steady state utilization of revolving
debt, and consumption.
Proposition 2: In the presence of an illiquid savings instrument, total monthly
consumption (and thus average daily consumption) decreases with paycheck fre-
quency.
Proof. By construction, as pay frequency increases, F (the length of the pay
period in days) decreases. Equation 1.7 shows that if F shrinks, s will increase. The
increase in s causes the household to consume less.
Proposition 3: In the presence of an illiquid savings instrument, utilization of
revolving debt decreases with paycheck frequency.
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Proof. See that total monthly spending decreases with paycheck frequency
(Proposition 2). Since total monthly borrowing equals α times total monthly con-
sumption, this will consequently equal the monthly repayment.
It is important to note that all of these hypotheses are a result of the illiquid
savings mechanism since they did not arise in the baseline framework. Higher
paycheck frequency (lower F) raises the illiquid savings rate. Even though it may
seem counterintuitive, there are two primary explanations. First, less frequent pay-
ments are less liquid, as in they take more time to happen. Therefore, by reduc-
ing the amount in the illiquid savings vehicle, the agent hedges against illiquidity
arising from her payment schedule. Second, less frequent payments are larger in
magnitude. As we can see for c1, the agent consumes a smaller fraction of them in
the beginning of the cycle, naturally generating liquid savings to be used in sub-
sequent periods. Hence, the agent’s preference for liquidity makes her allocate a
lower share of income to illiquid savings.
These predictions are the product of interaction of present bias with the differ-
ent levels of liquidity generated by different paycheck frequencies, and how the
agent uses financial products to build her optimal liquidity menu while maximiz-
ing utility of consumption. Figure 1.1 illustrates how the typical month looks like
for differently paid households in terms of their liquid savings, utilization of re-
volving debt, given their optimal consumption and savings decisions. When liquid
holdings are negative, that means that there is no cash from the consumer’s pay-
check on hand. When the account balance is above zero, the consumer is spending
from her available cash. As paycheck frequency increases, we observe that the
shaded area, corresponding to the stock of credit card debt, reduces in size for the
same period of 28 days. This debt is repaid at the arrival of each paycheck, and so,
total credit card repayment is also expected to decrease with paycheck frequency.
Our conceptual framework only defines the demand for credit by the household.
We proceed with a simple thought experiment on what the implications for the
supply of credit might be. Consider the average bank balance (or liquid holdings)
of two households with the same income stream but different paycheck frequencies.
A household that is paid once a month is, on average, further from the zero-balance
line than a household that is paid weekly. Hence, a risk-averse lender knows that a
shock will have stronger consequences to a household that is paid more frequently.
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Figure 1.1. Liquid holdings balance, credit card utilization: This figure shows the intra-paycyle
liquid holding account balance, given theoretical predictions for consumption and savings, for
monthly, bi-weekly and weekly paid households.
Thus, we expect less frequently paid households to have a higher supply of credit,
matching the demand effects.
This mechanism of different account balances across households of different in-
come groups will result in the same dollar-amount of unexpected expenses having
a higher probability of causing an overdraft or bounced check for a household that
is paid more frequently.
To summarize, our theoretical predictions are: (i) higher paycheck frequency
should be related with lower utilization of revolving debt, and (ii) higher paycheck
frequency should be related with higher incidence of financial shortfalls.
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1.3 Data and Methods
1.3.1 Paycheck Frequency in the United States
Forty four U.S. states have regulated paycheck frequency.3 Such regulations are
likely to be partially driven by the financial fragility of many U.S. households, 40%
of whom would not be able to pay upfront for a $400 unexpected expense (Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2017)). Historically, pay frequency
has occurred no more than weekly. Recently, however, technological advances have
facilitated the increased pay frequency to households, though the adoption of such
technologies has yet to become mainstream.
There is considerable variation in the timing of pay across employers in the
United States, and in this paper we focus on workers who are paid on regular
intervals such as weekly, bi-weekly, semi-monthly, and monthly. While the defi-
nition of weekly and monthly pay frequencies is obvious, the distinction between
bi-weekly and semi-monthly is more subtle. Individuals who are paid bi-weekly
receive paychecks every two weeks while individuals who are paid semi-monthly
receive paychecks twice a month. This means that individuals with bi-weekly pay-
checks will receive 26 paychecks per year while individuals with semi-monthly
paychecks will receive 24 paychecks a year.
1.3.2 Account Aggregator Data
Our data comes from an online account aggregator. Account aggregators let house-
holds monitor several financial accounts online, combining them into a single plat-
form. Households grant the aggregator access to their various accounts (e.g. check-
ing, savings, credit card, brokerage, retirement, mortgage, and student loan). The
aggregator will then provide spending reports, balance sheets, etc.
The specific data we have from our aggregator is limited to checking account,
savings account, and credit card transactions. Thus, our baseline dataset is a
transaction-level panel, where we observe amount, date, and description of each
transaction that a household makes. The information is similar to what one would
3These regulations, known as “state payday requirements,” are summarized for each year in the
website of the U.S. Department of Labor, being part of the state specific regulation on wages and
hourly work.
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observe in a monthly checking account or credit card statement, with each trans-
action having a date, amount, and description. In order to protect the identity of
the household, all personally identifiable information has been removed from the
data, with only a unique user ID allowing us to track a given household over time.
More information about the dataset can be found in Baugh et al. (2018a).
The dataset is particularly well suited for answering the question on the effect of
paycheck frequency on household outcomes because we observe both the timing of
pay alongside relevant financial outcomes like distress and credit card borrowing.
A plausible concern with our sample is self-selection. Gelman et al. (2018) and
Baker and Yannelis (2017) devote significant effort to understand the extent to
which self-selection is a concern in aggregator data. They find that their aggrega-
tors have a higher concentration of younger and male users than in the population
of U.S. consumers. We do not see as a major concern for the issue under analysis,
as paycheck frequency is not known to be systematically different between men
and women, or to vary across ages.
In Table 1.1 we present the basic summary statistics for households in our sam-
ple. The first two columns show summary statistics for the universe of households
in our dataset, while the last two columns show summary statistics for the subset
of households with regular paychecks that which we use in our final sample. The
average monthly income is $5,190 for the universe of households and $4,656 for
the subset of households with regular paychecks. The difference in salary across
the two groups could be explained by higher income individuals being more likely
to earn irregular salaries. It could also be explained by dual-income households
more likely to be classified as having irregular income due to the non-synchronous
income receipts across the two earners.
While income is somewhat higher than the U.S. average, it is noteworthy that
this would bias us against finding supportive evidence of our predictions. To the
extent that our sample is more sophisticated than the average U.S. household, our
sample should be less likely to exhibit any response to differences in pay frequency.
Table 1.1 shows that payments to credit cards are sizable in both groups, par-
ticularly when expressed as a percentage of income. For households in our final
sample, we observe monthly credit payments of $1,770, which exceeds credit card
borrowing of $705. The difference between credit card payments and borrowing is
not caused by a systemic credit card deleveraging across all households. Rather, it
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is a result of households not linking all of their credit cards to the account aggrega-
tor. Consider a scenario in which a household has two credit cards, one of which
is linked to the aggregator and the other unlinked. If the household spends $2,000
on the linked credit card and $1,000 on the unlinked credit card, we only observe
the $2,000 borrowing on the linked card. However, since we observe the primary
checking account for all users, we will see the subsequent payments of $2,000 and
$1,000 to the linked and unlinked credit cards, respectively. In this manner, we
have a complete picture of credit card payments regardless whether the underly-
ing credit cards are linked or not. For robustness, we present both measures of
credit card utilization in this paper: linked credit card borrowing and total (linked
+ unlinked) credit card payments. In all instances, the two variables produce qual-
itatively similar results, though the credit card payments are quantitatively larger.
Since our theoretical model has predictions for the frequency of financial dis-
tress, we create an indicator variable that equals one if a household experiences
an overdraft or bounced check in a given day. As shown in Table 1.1, households
experience financial distress 11% of the time, corresponding to about 40 days per
year.
1.3.3 Paycheck Frequency Identification
The dataset primarily spans the time period of between 2011 and 2015. In order
to classify households into their respective paycheck frequency group, we keep
household income streams that have no more than 5 payments in each month since
the smallest frequency we aim to identify is weekly. Additionally, we require at
least 10 consecutive paychecks for the household to enter the sample. We drop
payments for which the number of days between the current paycheck and the
last paycheck is too long (more than 40 days). Finally, in an effort to focus on
the primary income stream for the household, we require that the given paycheck
constitute at least 70% of the household’s total income for the given month.
For each household, we compute the median interval between paychecks (me-
dian delta), the number of paychecks per calendar month, and the number of pay-
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checks per year. These parameters easily allow us to classify each income stream
as weekly, bi-weekly, semi-monthly, or monthly.4
After classifying the frequency of each household’s income streams, we eliminate
any household-year for which the income streams fall into multiple categories (as
would be the case for a dual income household with one member paid weekly and
the other monthly). Even though this filter restricts our sample size, it results in
a sample of households whose within-cycle behavior most resembles what would
be the steady-state theoretical counterpart. However, when investigating within-
household changes in pay frequency in Section 1.5, we remove this restriction.
The resultant distribution of pay schedules is shown in Figure 1.2. In this figure,
we compare the distribution of pay frequency in our dataset with that published by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). As shown in the figure, the pay frequency
of our sample maps reasonably well with the BLS data, though our dataset contains
fewer households that are paid weekly and more households that are paid semi-
monthly and bi-weekly.
As a validation exercise for this algorithm, for each paycheck we compute the
number of days relative to the prior calendar month’s last paycheck. We refer to
this distance as the paycycle time frame. If the paycheck frequency is identified
correctly, we should observe all the households in a given paycheck frequency
group getting their paycheck around exactly the same time, relative to last month’s
last paycheck.
Plotting the histogram of this variable by paycheck frequency, we obtain a por-
trait of the pay schedule of each group. As shown in Panel A of Figure 1.3, the
frequency classification algorithm is highly effective in classifying each of the four
paycheck frequency schedules. As expected, we observe a weekly pattern in the
weekly classification with a minority of months with five weeks, the bi-weekly
schedule exhibits payments every two weeks with no irregular pattern, and the
4Monthly schedule is designated if the number of payments per year is less than 16 AND
median delta is more than 25 days AND number of payments per calendar month is not greater
than 2. Semi-Monthly schedule is designated if the number of payments per year is between 16 and
25 AND the median delta is between 10 and 25 days AND the number of payments per calendar
month is not greater than 3. Bi-Weekly schedule is designated if the number of payments per
year is between 25 and 49 AND the median delta is between 10 and 25 days AND the number of
payments per calendar month is not greater than 3. Weekly schedule is designated if the number of
payments per year is more than 49 AND the median delta is smaller than 10 days AND the number
of payments per calendar month is not greater than 5.
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Figure 1.2. Paycheck Frequency Distribution - Sample versus Public Data: Data from the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) available online. The unit of observation in the BLS distribution is
a business, while in our dataset the unit of observation is a household.
semi-monthly and monthly pay dates show the effect of longer versus shorter
months.
The algorithm’s criteria are loose enough to allow both for this variation and for
variation caused by banking transaction limitations, such as Sundays and holidays
that may make the employer’s payroll service to be done some days in advance
or experience some delay until banking activity is registered. We also observe this
minority of days around the modal pay dates in each cluster.
Additionally, in Panel B of Figure 1.3 we plot the histogram of actual calendar
day of month. It provides evidence of the validity of the algorithm, especially
the distinction between bi-weekly and semi-monthly pay schedules. A bi-weekly
schedule does not imply a specific calendar day of month as a pay date. However,
in a semi-monthly schedule, the dominant cluster is in payments on the 14-15th
and 29-30th of each month. As expected, weekly pay schedules do not impose a
pattern in terms of calendar month, and monthly pay schedules cluster at the end
of month.
1.3.4 Outcomes and Baseline Empirical Analysis
In the previous section, we identified households as belonging to one of the four
paycheck frequency categories (weekly, bi-weekly, semi-monthly, and monthly).
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(a) Paycycle Timeline
(b) Day of Month
Figure 1.3. Validation of Classification Algorithm: We plot the histogram of income streams per
time variable. In Panel A, the time variable is what we call paycycle timeline, which is the number
of days relative to last month’s last paycheck. If paycheck frequency is well identified, paychecks
should align over this variable. In Panel B, we conduct the same exercise but for actual calendar
day of month.
However, when mapping the bi-weekly and semi-monthly groups to their theoret-
ical counterpart, the parameter of F in the model will have almost identical values
across the two groups. Consequently, we combine these two groups into a sin-
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gle group denoted ’semi-monthly’ group for the remainder of our paper. As a
result, our empirical analysis will focus on three pay frequency groups: weekly,
semi-monthly, and monthly.
We proceed by selecting variables from the data to best match to their theoretical
counterparts. Recall that our main theoretical predictions involved levels revolving
debt and financial distress. We proxy for financial distress by creating a distress
indicator that takes the value of one every day a household either overdrafts or
bounces a check. While we do not directly observe credit card balances in our data
(we only observe flows), we can proxy for revolving debt balances by looking at the
payments to credit card accounts. Naturally, higher flows to credit card accounts
will correlate with credit card usage and higher credit card balances.
In our cross-sectional analysis, the empirical specification is:
Yit = φ′Freqi + λ(DOW,t) + λ(DOM,t) + λ(MM,t) + λ(YYYY,t) + εit,
where Yit is the outcome variable for user i at day t, Freqi is a vector of indicator
variables for the paycheck frequency classification, where the omitted category is
Monthly and λ(DOW,t), λ(DOM,t), λ(MM,t), and λ(YYYY,t) are calendar day of week,
calendar day of month, calendar month and calendar year fixed-effects, respec-
tively. These fixed effects control for any seasonal pattern in consumers’ transac-
tions. We also run the same specification in which outcomes are in percentage of
monthly income, and further perform a variation in which we include the average
household monthly income as a control.
Since we are testing for the existence of a systematic pattern in the average day
of these differently paid households, the vector of coefficients of interest here is
φ. Since our theoretical model produces monotonic predictions with respect to the
timing of pay, we likewise anticipate monotonic empirical results with respect to
the timing of pay. We are not concerned about the significance of an individual
indicator variable, but rather the joint significance of the two indicator variables.
For our main results, we collapse our dataset in frequency-day bins, and weight
each bin by its respective number of observations, following Angrist and Pischke
(2008). In this manner, we observe systematic variation; only observing the average
household in an average day and ensuring that the patterns we observe are not
driven by noisy observations. We then run the specification, both in dollars and in
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percentages of monthly income:
Yf t = φ′Freq f + λ(DOW,t) + λ(DOM,t) + λ(MM,t) + λ(YYYY,t) + ε f t
where the variables are the same as before, but the subscript f denotes paycheck
frequency group.
In this specification, when we control for monthly income there will be no
within-group variation in income that could explain the variability in the outcomes.
Hence, in the collapsed results we expect the coefficient for monthly income to be
small. As a robustness exercise, we rerun the analysis at the household level and
the results are qualitatively similar. These results are presented in Table 1.8 and
Table 1.9.
1.4 Cross-Sectional Results
We begin by presenting the summary statistics for each of the paycheck frequency
groups in Table 1.2. As shown in the table, incomes across the three pay frequency
groups are similar, but not identical. We find that weekly paid households have
the lowest monthly income of $4,168, while semi-monthly and monthly paid house-
holds have incomes of $4,773 and $4,885, respectively. We explore differences in the
level of income more thoroughly in Figure 1.4, which plots the distribution of in-
come across the three income groups. As shown, there is considerable overlap in
the distribution of income across the three pay frequency groups, though weekly-
paid households are more likely to have lower pay and monthly paid households
are more likely to have higher pay.
Table 1.2 also shows a striking difference in payments to credit cards across the
three pay frequency groups. Weekly paid households average $1,320 in monthly
payments to credit cards, while semi-monthly and monthly paid households av-
erage $1,872 and $2,028, respectively. The other dependent variable of interest,
the probability of financial distress, also exhibit a monotonic pattern across pay-
check frequency groups; more frequently paid households exhibit almost twice the
frequency of financial distress as monthly paid households.
We proceed with our regression analysis in Table 1.3. In this table, we regress
measures of credit card utilization an indicator variable for semi-monthly and
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Figure 1.4. Monthly Income Distribution by Paycheck Frequency: We plot the kernel density
for the monthly income of each household-month in our classified sample, split by paycheck
frequency.
monthly pay groups. The omitted group is monthly paid households. The de-
pendent variable in the Columns (1) and (2) is credit card borrowing normalized
by monthly income, while the dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is the
dollar of credit card borrowing. The dependent variable in the Columns (5) and
(6) is credit card repayment normalized by monthly income, while the dependent
variable in Columns (7) and (8) is the dollar of credit card repayment. Finally, in
odd columns we do not control for the level of income, while in even columns we
control for the level of income.
Since our theoretical prediction is that lower paycheck frequency results in greater
utilization of revolving debt and a lower incidence of financial distress, we predict
to observe a monotonic pattern across pay frequency groups. Since the omitted
category is the monthly group, we expect negative (positive) coefficients on the
two indicator variables for semi-monthly and weekly paycheck frequencies when
evaluating revolving debt (financial distress). Further, we expect the coefficient for
the weekly indicator variable to have a higher magnitude value than the coefficient
for the semi-monthly indicator variable. The results are shown in Table 1.3.
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Consistent with our hypothesis, we observe a monotonic pattern of credit card
utilization across the three income payment frequencies. Monthly paid house-
holds, the omitted group, exhibit the highest amount of credit card utilization. The
semi-monthly paid group exhibits the next highest credit card utilization, while
the weekly paid group exhibits the lowest credit card utilization. These results are
robust to the inclusion of income controls, as shown in even columns. The 95% con-
fidence intervals for semi-monthly and weekly coefficients do not overlap, meaning
that conditional means are statistically different. The F-test for joint significance of
the two indicator variables in explaining the variation in these two outcomes yield
high test statistics, with p-values below 5%.
We begin by discussing the first four columns Table 1.3 which analyze the bor-
rowing behavior of households, then proceed to discuss the last four columns
which analyze the repayment behavior of households. As explained in Section 1.3.2,
the disparity in magnitude across these variables is driven by the fact that we only
observe borrowing on linked credit cards, while we observe repayment to both
linked and unlinked credit cards. As a result, credit card repayments are economi-
cally larger.
For reference, monthly paid households borrow around 15 percentage points
($788/$4,885) of their monthly income on linked credit cards as shown in Table 1.2.
Column (2) of Table 1.3 shows that semi-monthly paid households borrow 4.4 per-
centage points less of their income per month than monthly paid households (-
0.147 p.p. × 30). Finally, Column (2) shows that weekly-paid households borrow
8.9 percentage points less of their income per month than monthly paid house-
holds (-0.297 p.p. × 30). Relative to the baseline borrowing amount of 15 percent-
age points for monthly paid households, the reduction in monthly borrowing of
4.4 percentage points and 8.9 percentage points are economically large, reflecting
reductions in borrowing of 29% and 59%, respectively.
When turning to the final four columns of Table 1.3, the results are even more
pronounced. For reference, monthly paid households repay around 42 percentage
points ($2,028/$4,885) of their monthly income on credit cards as shown in Ta-
ble 1.2. Column (6) shows that semi-monthly paid households repay 12.9 percent-
age points less of their income per month than monthly paid households (-0.431
p.p. × 30). Finally, Column (6) also shows that weekly-paid households repay 37.5
percentage points less of their income per month than monthly paid households (-
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1.250 p.p. × 30). Relative to the baseline repayment amount of 42 percentage points
for monthly paid households, the reduction in monthly borrowing of 12.9 percent-
age points and 37.5 percentage points are economically large, reflecting reductions
in borrowing of 31% and 90%, respectively.
The above results provide strong support for our prediction that increases in pay
frequency result in lower borrowing. Next, we evaluate whether pay frequency
influences the likelihood of financial distress. As a reminder, we hypothesize that
more frequently paid households will spend more time closer to the zero-balance
line, increasing the likelihood that they will experience financial distress, which we
proxy for with the propensity to overdraft. Table 1.4 shows results for this test.
In the first two columns of Table 1.4, the dependent variable is the daily dollars of
overdraft or bounced check fees incurred by a household. In the last two columns,
the overdraft fees are replaced by an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 of
the household overdrafts or bounces a check on a given day.
As shown in Table 1.4, we observe the anticipated monotonic pattern arises of
distress with pay frequency. More frequently paid households are more likely
to overdraft or bounce checks, and consequently pay higher overdraft fees. The
95% confidence interval of these coefficients does not overlap and the coefficients
prove to be jointly significant in explaining the variation in incidence and cost of
shortfalls. The adjusted R2 is not negligible, and the introduction of a control for
average monthly income level not only proves not to change the estimates but also
lacks individual statistical significance.
In Column (1) we show that, relative to monthly paid households, semi-monthly
paid households incur $0.75 more in overdraft fees per month ($0.025 × 30) and
weekly paid households incur $2.13 more in overdraft fees per month ($0.071 × 30).
Column (2) shows that these results are slightly strengthened with the inclusion of
income level controls. Similarly, Columns (3) and (4) show how the probability of
financial distress varies across pay frequency groups. As shown in Column (4), the
results hold when controlling for the level of income. Column (4) shows that, rel-
ative to monthly paid households, semi-weekly paid households experience a 7.8
percentage point increase in the likelihood of financial distress per month (0.260
p.p. × 30) while weekly paid households experience a 12.4 percentage point in-
crease in the likelihood of financial distress per month (0.414 p.p. × 30). Given that
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the monthly probability of experience a bounced check or an overdraft for monthly
paid households is 9 p.p., these are economically large effects.
The above empirical results are consistent with the presence of binding liquidity
constraints, which is integral to our theoretical framework. If liquidity constraints
were not binding, consumers with a high level of liquid holdings would simply
draw from their savings. If this were the case, we should see no response within
the paycycle to income receipts in our shortfall incidence outcome. Households
would be as likely to overdraft or bounce a check right after their paycheck receipt
as they would be any other day or even before they paycheck receipt. To test this,
we modify our empirical specification. We now interact indicator variables for the
paycycle timeline days with the indicator variables for paycheck frequency, and
keep all other fixed effects. Because paycycle timeframe varies among households
within paycheck frequency groups, we estimate this model with household-level
data. In Figure 1.5, we plot the coefficients and the 95% confidence interval bands.
As shown in Figure 1.5, we find that paycheck schedule strongly determines the
incidence of financial shortfalls. In each 30-day paycycle, we observe one shortfall
cycle for monthly paid households, two for household paid twice a month and
four for households paid weekly. This is highly suggestive of binding liquidity
constraints and with financial relief coinciding with arrival of paycheck. We can
also interpret this as evidence that higher paycheck frequency is related with higher
frequency of financial distress.
One possible criticism to our approach is that splitting the sample by paycheck
frequency group might also split the sample by type of job, credit score, financial
sophistication, and other variables that noticeably are expected to be related with
the analyzed household financial outcomes. All these variables are also likely to
play a role in the resulting financial attainment of different households. We build
a proxy of financial attainment which is the household-level average of monthly
inflows minus monthly outflows, that shows the ability of such household to accu-
mulate or depreciate liquid holdings as account balance. We add this variable to
our main specification and run the regression analysis at the household-day level
to allow for variation in this outcome within each paycheck frequency groups. The
estimates are reported in Table 1.5.
The monotonic patterns in the coefficients through paycheck frequency still hold
in this specification for all outcomes, with non-overlapping 95% confidence inter-
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Figure 1.5. Within-cycle Timely Pattern of Financial Shortfalls: We plot the coefficient for
interactions of the paycheck frequency indicator variables with indicator variables for each
paycycle day (days from last month’s last paycheck), and the 95% confidence interval. The
dependent variable is the incidence of financial shortfalls.
23
vals. In terms of magnitudes, the dollar values of credit card utilization decrease
significantly, but are still economically large. The outcomes in percentages of in-
come and the shortfall incidence and costs still exhibit estimates around the same
estimated values in the main specification.
Another issue we address is that of differences in education. Our model shows
that irrationality, in the form of present bias, is a necessary condition for the testable
predictions we derive. An empirical counterpart to rationality is education. Hence,
we would expect our results to be stronger in more irrational (i.e. less educated)
environments than in less irrational environments. We merge the observed city
of residence of each household with the U.S. Census Bureau and compute the
fraction of each city that holds a college degree. We then build two subsamples: one
with high propensity to hold a college degree, comprised of all households whose
location lies in the third or fourth quartiles of the distribution of percentage of
population with a college degree; the other subsample has a low propensity to hold
a college degree, comprised of all households whose location lies in the bottom
quartile of the distribution of percentage of population with a college degree. We
report the results for the utilization of revolving debt outcomes in Table 1.6.
As shown in Table 1.6, the main results from Table 1.3 hold in the high- and low-
education subsamples, both in dollars and as a percentage of income. Specifically,
we find in both subsamples that credit card borrowing and repayment is mono-
tonically decreasing in pay frequency. Further, the results are less pronounced
for highly educated households, suggesting that paycheck frequency plays less of a
role in determining decisions of highly educated households. Similarly, in Table 1.7,
we analyze the financial shortfall outcomes for both the high- and low-education
groups.
As shown in Table 1.7, the main results from Table 1.4 hold in the high- and low-
education subsamples, both in terms of dollars and likelihood of financial shortfall.
Specifically, we find in both subsamples that distress is monotonically increasing
in pay frequency. Further, the results are less pronounced for highly educated
households, suggesting that paycheck frequency plays less of a role in determining
decisions of highly educated households.
As a final check that the results on these robustness checks are not driven by the
fact that they are conducted at the household-day level, instead of being collapsed
at paycheck frequency group-day level, we re-run our the analysis on Table 1.3
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and ?? using household-level data, to confirm that the directions and magnitudes
of the coefficients remain unchanged by our initial approach.
In Table 1.8 we see that the point estimates for the amount of credit card bor-
rowing remain largely unchanged from our baseline result in Table 1.3. This is true
both for credit card utilization outcomes, measured both in percentage of income
and in dollar terms.
Similarly, in Table 1.9 we see that the point estimates for the amount of financial
distress remain largely unchanged from our baseline result in Table 1.4. This is true
both for financial distress outcomes, measured both in dollar amount of banking
fees and the fraction of days in distress.
1.5 Within-Household Results
While the preceding section has documented the robust and monotonic relation
between pay frequency and household outcomes in the cross-section, the analysis
is still subject to endogeneity concerns. Despite controlling for the level of in-
come across pay frequency groups, it remains a possibility that there are omitted
variables correlated with pay frequency (sophistication, etc.) that are driving the
results.
To rule out these endogeneity concerns, we continue by analyzing within-household
changes to pay frequency in this section. This within-household framework allows
us to include household fixed effects into the analysis, ruling out the possibility
that our results are driven by omitted variables such as financial sophistication.
Specifically, we analyze job changers and determine whether household out-
comes of credit card borrowing and financial distress change as a result of changes
to pay frequency. We identify job changers by observing the payroll description
within each household over time. Job changers have transaction descriptions that
change (“Ford Motor Company" transitions to “The Boeing Company"). We split
this sample of job changers into job changers that also changed their paycheck
frequency (treatment group) and job changers who kept being paid at the same
frequency.
Even though changing jobs is an endogenous event, whether paycheck frequency
changes upon a job change can easily be thought as exogenous, and because we
are making this comparison among job changers, all the endogeneity concerns
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regarding the change in job are ruled out. We collect monthly averages of daily
outcomes 6 months prior to 6 months after the job change for both treatment and
control individuals. Control individuals are chosen by nearest-neighbor matching
on income before and after the change (to make sure they have a similar change in
jobs), size of mortgage payment, state of residence and months spent unemployed
between jobs, to make sure we approximate the most to the ideal counterfactual.
We code the treatment variable, change in paycheck frequency, as follows. If pay-
check frequency increases, it takes the value of 1. If paycheck frequency decreases,
it takes the value of -1. If paycheck frequency is unchanged, it takes the value of 0.
Summary statistics for both treatment and control groups can be seen in Table 1.10.
As shown in the table, both treatment and control groups have similar levels of
income, saving, and consumption.
In the differences-in-differences regression framework, we use household and
event-time fixed effects in all specifications except for the raw regression. House-
hold fixed effects allow us to measure the within-household causal effect of an
increase in paycheck frequency only using the time variation. Event time fixed
effects are a synthetic way to align all the events to the same date. We run the
regression for windows of 6, 3 and 2 months before and after the job change event.
In Table 1.11, we can see that increases in paycheck frequency decrease credit
card utilization by a sizeable amount. We focus on outcomes as a percentage
of monthly income, so that the coefficient is meaningful to all pairs of matched
households. In order to simplify the discussion of results, we will focus on the +/-
3 month observation window shown in Columns (3) and (7), though our findings
are similar for other observation windows. In Column (3), we find that households
experience a 11.6 p.p. reduction in credit card borrowing (-0.387 p.p. × 30), while
in Column (7) we find that a 15.8 p.p. reduction in credit card repayment (-0.527
p.p. × 30). The table shows that the effect increases as the time window gets nar-
rower, reinforces the validity of the job change as a shock to paycheck frequency.
In contrast to Table 1.11, when we analyze financial shortfalls in Table 1.12 we
fail to find statistically significant effects for changes in pay frequency. Households
whose paycheck frequency increases seem to pay less overdraft fees as a percentage
of income, but they do not seem to experience a difference in shortfalls, on average.
However, as we have seen in Figure 1.5, within the paycycle, being in a different pay
schedule strongly determines when the household will have the highest propensity
26
to experience financial distress. The same pattern arises when we run the same
analysis just for the matched sample used for causal analysis.
Lastly, in Table 1.13, we validate that we still observe the first set of results hold-
ing for the matched sample, as a robustness check for the internal validity of the
subsample used for causal analysis. In summary, we find it is reasonable to assert
that there is a causal link between paycheck frequency and credit card utilization
outcomes.
1.6 Conclusion
We show that households paid that are paid less frequently borrow use credit cards
more but are less likely to experience financial distress. Weekly paid households
borrow 30-40% less with credit cards, on average, than monthly paid households.
Weekly paid households have at least double the likelihood that they will incur
an overdraft or bounced check when compared to those paid monthly. These re-
sults still hold when controlled for household-level financial attainment and are
stronger in environments with lower education levels, consistent with the concep-
tual framework in which irrationality is a necessary condition for paycheck fre-
quency to exhibit an effect. We document that, within paycycle, the incidence of
shortfalls follows a sharp alignment with the paycheck schedule, suggesting that
these individuals are financially constrained.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes theoretically
and empirically the implications of paycheck frequency on credit card utilization.
Policies intended to regulate the timing of pay from the firm’s perspective should
be mindful of the consequences to household credit card utilization and financial
distress, consistent with Parsons and Van Wesep (2013). On the consumer pro-
tection side, financial services that support financial decision making and act as
artificial self-control devices will be successful in helping those more vulnerable to
the effects of paycheck frequency on their choices.
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1.7 Tables
Variable Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Total Income 5,190$           27,755 4,656$           3,359
Net Savings (40)$               18,752 (10)$               7,794
Net Transfer (182)$             58,506 (199)$             37,852
Borrowing 688$              2,738 705$              3,112
Other Inflows 2,232$           201,969 1,898$           44,341
Total Inflows 7,889$           202,678 7,051$           53,559
Recurring Expenses 2,671$           5,831 2,780$           4,898
  Mortgage Payment 609$              2,714 667$              2,381
  Car Payment 122$              455 123$              471
  Credit Card Payment 1,733$           4,699 1,770$           3,900
  Utilities 206$              386 221$              475
Banking Fees 3$                  15 3$                  14
Payday Repayment 3$                  65 4$                  74
Loan Repayment 87$                739 88$                687
Interest Expense 13$                49 14$                52
Other Spending 4,797$           59,261 4,317$           37,879
Total Outflow 7,575$           60,055 7,205$           38,571
% with Financial Shortfall 11% 0.32 11% 0.32
# Households 250,351 183,768
Full Sample Identified Paycheck Frequency
Table 1.1. Sample Summary Statistics: This table provides summary statistics from our sample
from 2011-2015. The unit of measure is the household-month. The first two columns present
summary statistics for all households using the account aggregator in our sample. The next two
columns present summary statistics for the subset of households for which we observe regular
income streams, which form the basis for the remainder of our analysis. We consider a given
household has a shortfall in a given month if we observe the incidence of a bounced check or an
overdraft.
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Variable Monthly Semi-Monthly Weekly
Total Income 4,885$           4,773$           4,168$           
Net Savings (36)$               (4)$                 (21)$               
Net Transfer (34)$               (253)$             (75)$               
Borrowing 788$              752$              512$              
Other Inflows 2,833$           1,798$           1,873$           
Total Inflows 8,435$           7,066$           6,457$           
Recurring Expenses 3,055$           2,905$           2,246$           
  Mortgage Payment 708$              691$              566$              
  Car Payment 117$              123$              125$              
  Credit Card Payment 2,028$           1,872$           1,320$           
  Utilities 202$              219$              235$              
Banking Fees 2$                  3$                  4$                  
Payday Repayment 4$                  4$                  4$                  
Loan Repayment 99$                90$                77$                
Interest Expense 13$                15$                13$                
Other Spending 5,281$           4,274$           4,086$           
Total Outflow 8,453$           7,289$           6,430$           
% with Financial Shortfall 9% 11% 14%
Paycheck Frequency
Table 1.2. Summary Statistics by Paycheck Frequency: This table provides summary statistics
for our sample, split by paycheck frequency. The unit of measure is the household month. We
classify each household according to paycheck frequency. We consider a given household has a
shortfall in a given month if we observe the incidence of a bounced check or an overdraft.
Variables are winsorized at 5%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Semi-Monthly -0.155 -0.147 -4.915 -4.007 -0.383 -0.431 -13.130 -13.770
(0.006) (0.007) (0.273) (0.297) (0.019) (0.019) (0.902) (0.915)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Weekly -0.366 -0.297 -16.100 -8.836 -0.868 -1.250 -42.500 -47.660
(0.006) (0.019) (0.260) (0.726) (0.018) (0.037) (0.849) (1.521)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Monthly-Income 0.000 0.011 -0.001 -0.008
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
R2 0.505 0.510 0.533 0.561 0.717 0.741 0.732 0.734
Observations 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265
Adjusted R2 0.5 0.505 0.529 0.556 0.714 0.738 0.729 0.731
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
F-test 1771.28 237.27 2062.45 104.39 1328.19 609.88 1715.61 492.91
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rolling Borrowing Rolling Repayment
% of Income (p.p.) $/day % of Income (p.p.) $/day
Table 1.3. Regression Analysis - Paycheck Frequency and Credit Card Utilization Behavior: This table shows regression estimates of
differences in credit card utilization explained by paycheck frequency. We report results both for credit card utilization measured in dollars
per day or daily percentage of monthly income. Semi-Monthly and Weekly are indicator variables for paycheck frequency, in which the
omitted category is Monthly. The regressions include day of month, month, year and day of week fixed effects to control for time specific
fluctuations in the outcomes. The regression is run at the paycheck frequency group-day level, and each observation is weighted by the
number of households in the respective group-day bin, so as to obtain consistent estimates. The last two rows are the F-test statistic and
p-value for the joint significance of both paycheck frequency indicator variables.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Semi-Monthly 0.025 0.025 0.259 0.260
(0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.013)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Weekly 0.071 0.076 0.401 0.414
(0.002) (0.003) (0.013) (0.021)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Monthly Income 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
[0.009] [0.418]
R2 0.743 0.744 0.751 0.751
Num. Obs 5,265 5,265 5,265 5,265
Adjusted R2 0.740 0.741 0.749 0.749
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
F-test 707.59 403.47 460.94 244.48





Table 1.4. Regression Analysis - Paycheck Frequency and Financial Shortfalls Incidence: This
table shows regression estimates of differences in the incidence of bounced checks and overdrafts
explained by paycheck frequency. Semi-Monthly and Weekly are indicator variables for paycheck
frequency, in which the omitted category is Monthly. The regressions include day of month,
month, year and day of week fixed effects to control for time specific fluctuations in the outcomes.
The regression is run at the paycheck frequency group-day level, and each observation is weighted
by the number of households in the respective group-day bin, so as to obtain consistent estimates.
The last two rows are the F-test statistic and p-value for the joint significance of both paycheck
frequency indicator variables.
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Banking Fees % in Shortfall
$/day % of Income $/day % of Income %/day p.p.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Semi-Monthly -0.159 -0.386 -4.548 -11.750 0.024 0.260
(0.002) (0.006) (0.057) (0.250) (0.001) (0.004)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Weekly -0.397 -0.891 -13.110 -31.490 0.064 0.409
(0.002) (0.006) (0.059) (0.255) (0.001) (0.005)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Income Level 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.017 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Accumulated Balance 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
R2 0.007 0.004 0.020 0.013 0.001 0.003
Num. Obs 83,656,471 83,656,471 83,656,471 83,656,471 83,656,471 83,656,471
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.004 0.020 0.013 0.001 0.003
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rolling Borrowing Rolling Repayment
Table 1.5. Robustness Check - Controlling for the Ability to Save: This table shows regression
estimates of differences in credit card utilization behavior and in the incidence of bounced checks
and overdrafts explained by paycheck frequency. Semi-Monthly and Weekly are indicator variables
for paycheck frequency, in which the omitted category is Monthly. The regressions include day of
month, month, year and day of week fixed effects to control for time specific fluctuations in the
outcomes. The regression is run at the household-day level. Accumulated Balance is the
household-level monthly average of total inflows minus total outflows.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Education Level High Low High Low High Low High Low
Semi-Monthly -0.011 -0.222 -1.251 -8.528 -0.217 -0.524 -7.310 -20.100
(0.003) (0.003) (0.119) (0.092) (0.012) (0.010) (0.482) (0.445)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Weekly -0.260 -0.392 -15.260 -18.160 -0.667 -1.100 -35.640 -56.890
(0.003) (0.003) (0.120) (0.095) (0.012) (0.011) (0.485) (0.453)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
R2 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005
Num. Obs 19,520,998 35,643,832 19,520,998 35,643,832 19,520,998 35,643,832 19,520,998 35,643,832
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rolling Borrowing Rolling Repayment
% of Income (p.p.) $/day % of Income (p.p.) $/day
Table 1.6. Sample Split - Propensity to Hold a College Degree and Credit Card Utilization: This table shows regression estimates of
differences in credit card utilization behavior explained by paycheck frequency. Semi-Monthly and Weekly are indicator variables for
paycheck frequency, in which the omitted category is Monthly. The regressions include day of month, month, year and day of week fixed
effects to control for time specific fluctuations in the outcomes. The regression is run at the household-day level. High (Low) Education
subsample is the subsample containing all households whose city is above (below) the third (first) quartile of the distribution of percentage
of college degrees.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education Level High Low High Low
Semi-Monthly 0.011 0.035 0.179 0.359
(0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.006)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Weekly 0.067 0.079 0.299 0.484
(0.002) (0.001) (0.010) (0.007)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
R2 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
Num. Obs 19,520,998 35,643,832 19,520,998 35,643,832
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003





Table 1.7. Sample Split - Propensity to Hold a College Degree and Financial Shortfalls: This
table shows regression estimates of differences in the incidence of bounced checks and overdrafts
explained by paycheck frequency. Semi-Monthly and Weekly are indicator variables for paycheck
frequency, in which the omitted category is Monthly. The regressions include day of month,
month, year and day of week fixed effects to control for time specific fluctuations in the outcomes.
The regression is run at the household-day level. High (Low) Education subsample is the
subsample containing all households whose city is above (below) the third (first) quartile of the
distribution of percentage of college degrees.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Semi-Monthly -0.155 -0.159 -4.915 -4.542 -0.383 -0.386 -13.130 -11.750
(0.002) (0.002) (0.057) (0.057) (0.006) (0.006) (0.251) (0.250)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Weekly -0.366 -0.397 -16.100 -13.110 -0.868 -0.891 -42.500 -31.490
(0.002) (0.002) (0.059) (0.059) (0.006) (0.006) (0.256) (0.255)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Monthly Income 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.017
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
R2 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.019 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.013
Num. Obs 83,656,471 83,656,471 83,656,471 83,656,471 83,656,471 83,656,471 83,656,471 83,656,471
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.019 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.013
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Rolling Borrowing Rolling Repayment
% of Income (p.p.) $/day % of Income (p.p.) $/day
Table 1.8. Individual Level - Paycheck Frequency and Credit Card Utilization: This table shows regression estimates of differences in
credit card utilization explained by paycheck frequency. Semi-Monthly and Weekly are indicator variables for paycheck frequency, in which
the omitted category is Monthly. The regressions include day of month, month, year and day of week fixed effects to control for time
specific fluctuations in the outcomes. The regression is run at the household-day level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Semi-Monthly 0.025 0.024 0.259 0.260
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Weekly 0.071 0.064 0.401 0.409
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Monthly Income 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
[0.000] [0.000]
R2 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
Num. Obs 83,656,471 83,656,471 83,656,471 83,656,471
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003





Table 1.9. Individual Level - Paycheck Frequency and Financial Shortfalls: This table shows
regression estimates of differences in the incidence of bounced checks and overdrafts explained by
paycheck frequency. Semi-Monthly and Weekly are indicator variables for paycheck frequency, in
which the omitted category is Monthly. The regressions include day of month, month, year and
day of week fixed effects to control for time specific fluctuations in the outcomes. The regression is
run at the household-day level.
36
Mean SD Mean SD
Total Income 4402 (10909) 4790 (15213)
Net Savings -8 (6719) -126 (4817)
Net Transfers -514 (28074) -311 (17772)
Borrowing 546 (1658) 587 (1629)
Other Inflows 1994 (43078) 1405 (18057)
Total Inflows 6420 (33298) 6345 (28815)
Recurring Expenses 2288 (4604) 2381 (4968)
   Mortgage Payment 497 (3090) 474 (1714)
   Car Payment 113 (577) 101 (433)
   Credit Card Payment 1494 (2867) 1617 (4248)
   Utilities 184 (243) 190 (650)
Banking Fees 0 (1) 0 (1)
Payday Repayment 3 (48) 5 (98)
Loan Repayment 72 (358) 85 (497)
Interest Expense 13 (55) 12 (47)
Other Spending 3621 (9595) 3635 (18718)
Total Outflow 5997 (11379) 6118 (20662)
% with Financial Shortfall 11% (0.3) 12% (0.3)
Control Group Treatment Group
Table 1.10. Summary Statistics - Treatment versus Control Groups: This table provides
summary statistics for the average monthly budget of the identified job changers. The unit of
measure is the household month. We identified and matched 20,716 job changers on income before
and after the job change, their mortgage payment, state of residence, time spent unemployed, and
paycheck frequency before the change. Treatment group contains job changers whose paycheck
frequency changed, and control group contains job changers whose paycheck frequency remained
the same.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Periods [-6,+6] [-6,+6] [-3,+3] [-2,+2] [-6,+6] [-6,+6] [-3,+3] [-2,+2]
Treat*Post -0.210 -0.213 -0.387 -0.593 -0.311 -0.322 -0.527 -0.757
(0.047) (0.044) (0.072) (0.094) (0.072) (0.066) (0.104) (0.135)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Treat 0.221 0.249 0.462 0.628 0.419 0.520 0.790 1.020
(0.043) (0.080) (0.127) (0.170) (0.064) (0.118) (0.185) (0.243)
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Post -1.290 -1.290 -2.250 -3.160 -1.820 -1.820 -3.220 -4.500
(0.034) (0.031) (0.051) (0.065) (0.051) (0.046) (0.074) (0.095)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
FE N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Observations 83861 83861 45494 32497 83861 83861 45494 32497
Adj R-Square 0.019 0.145 0.173 0.229 0.017 0.193 0.215 0.257
Borrowing (% of Income) Repayment (% of Income)
Table 1.11. Difference-in-Difference Results - Credit Card Utilization: This table shows regression estimates of differences in differences
for credit card utilization as a percentage of income. The first difference is on treatment (changing paycheck frequency upon a job change),
and the second is on time (the job change itself). The coefficient represent daily amounts. Fixed-effects are at the event time and household
levels. We run the event-study difference in difference for windows of 6, 3 and 2 months around the job change.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Periods [-6,+6] [-6,+6] [-3,+3] [-2,+2]
Treat*Post -0.076 -0.085 -0.255 -0.114
(0.318) (0.260) (0.351) (0.419)
[0.812] [0.743] [0.467] [0.786]
Treat -0.596 1.150 0.887 0.028
(0.236) (0.422) (0.580) (0.660)
[0.012] [0.007] [0.127] [0.967]
Post -0.320 -0.292 -0.562 -0.602
(0.223) (0.181) (0.246) (0.293)
[0.151] [0.108] [0.023] [0.040]
FE N Y Y Y
Observations 83861 83861 45494 32497
Adj R-Square 0.000 0.335 0.356 0.371
% in Shortfall (p.p.)
Table 1.12. Difference-in-Difference Results - Financial Shortfalls: This table shows regression
estimates of differences in differences for financial shortfalls. The first difference is on treatment
(changing paycheck frequency upon a job change), and the second is on time (the job change
itself). The coefficient represent daily amounts. Fixed-effects are at the event time and household
levels. We run the event-study difference in difference for windows of 6, 3 and 2 months around
the job change.
39
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Semi-Monthly -1.050 -1.550 -2.180 -2.910 1.970 1.690
(0.049) (0.049) (0.076) (0.075) (0.338) (0.342)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Weekly -1.080 -1.690 -2.390 -3.280 4.200 3.860
(0.054) (0.053) (0.083) (0.082) (0.369) (0.375)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Monthly Income 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 83,876 83,876 83,876 83,876 83,876 83,876
Adj R-Square 0.009 0.059 0.014 0.059 0.003 0.003
FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Borrowing (% of Income) Repayment (% of Income) % in Shortfall (p.p.)
Table 1.13. Pooled regression on Matched Sample: This table contains estimates for the pooled regressions, restricted to the matched job
changers sample. Semi-Monthly and Weekly are indicator variables for paycheck frequency, in which the omitted category is Monthly. The
regressions include day of month, month, year and day of week fixed effects to control for time specific fluctuations in the outcomes. The
regression is run at the household-month level.
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Chapter 2
Is Corporate Credit Risk Propagated to
Employees?
2.1 Introduction
Employment relationships link firms and consumers, two important types of bor-
rowers to which banks are exposed. Firms’ financing constraints affect their em-
ployment decisions.1 In turn, households’ employment terms, such as income,
tenure, and employment status affect their ability to repay credit, which should
affect their access to credit.2 Hence, it is plausible that employer credit risk puts
employee credit at risk as well. An immediate implication of this possible effect
is that a rational bank portfolio manager would recognize an employment-driven
correlation between corporate and retail portfolios, and react to employer credit
shocks by reducing the bank’s exposures to the associated employees. A second
implication is that the labor market connects firms’ and consumers’ credit markets,
serving as a channel of credit-risk transmission. Thus, credit and labor markets are
too intertwined to be regarded in isolation and policymakers should consider such
channels to avoid unintended consequences.
In this paper we answer the question whether credit risk is propagated from
firms to their employees. We exploit Brazilian administrative data linking banks,
firms, and households over the period running from 2013 through 2017 and merge
it with credit ratings to show that employer credit risk is a source of consumer
credit risk. Credit registry data allow us to estimate how employees’ loan terms
1For evidence of the effects of corporate financial constraints on employment see e.g. Adelino
et al. (2017), Almeida et al. (2012), Almeida et al. (2016), Bau and Matray (2020), Chodorow-Reich
(2013), Duygan-Bump et al. (2015), Falato and Liang (2016), and Hombert and Matray (2017).
Agrawal and Matsa (2013) show evidence that labor market frictions affect firms’ financial deci-
sions.
2See, for instance, Baugh and Correia (2021), ?, Bernstein (2019), and Donaldson et al. (2019).
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respond to public information on the deterioration of their employers’ creditwor-
thiness.
Our identification strategy exploits credit rating downgrades of publicly listed
firms, which act as a public signal of the deterioration of these firms’ creditworthi-
ness, increasing their financing constraints.
Using a difference-in-differences (DID) framework, we quantify how an increase
in an employer’s credit risk affects default rates among employees and the loan
terms (e.g. loan amounts, interest rates) they obtain. Bank identifiers make it pos-
sible to estimate within-bank effects, which allows us to absorb all bank-specific
variation that could contaminate our results. An important advantage in our ap-
proach with respect to causal inferences is that corporate downgrades are not likely
to be affected by employees’ credit risk. For example, truck drivers likely have no
influence on rating downgrades of their employers, and probably have a similar
credit assessment to other truck drivers employed by non-downgraded companies,
in the absence of a downgrade.
A remaining concern is the possibility that downgraded companies, which are
downgraded for being poorly managed, hire too many workers with characteristics
that are inherently correlated with poorer credit outcomes. Fortunately, our rich set
of worker-level controls for age, gender, schooling, and employment characteristics
ensure that the observed effects are not driven by individual-specific observables.
We use bank-year fixed effects to isolate the idiosyncratic deterioration of a firm’s
credit risk from other factors that simultaneously constrain the banking system and
downgraded firms.
Credit rating downgrades represent a significant tightening of firms’ credit con-
straints.3 We verify that a credit rating downgrade leads consistently to an eco-
nomically significant reduction of 26 basis points in corporate debt financing in the
subsequent year, which has a direct impact on employment and wages. Our work
adds the next step of this transmission in the picture by focusing on the consumer
credit outcomes for individuals who remain employed at a downgraded firm.
Our research produces three main results. First, we find that employees in firms
hit by credit rating downgrades face higher ex-post default risk than their coun-
terparts employed by non-downgraded firms. Employees of downgraded firms
3See, for instance, Almeida et al. (2017), Goh and Ederington (1993), Hand et al. (1992), and
Tang (2009). Credit downgrades damage banks’ ability to access wholesale funding and public debt
markets, increasing their cost of funding (see e.g. Adelino and Ferreira (2016)).
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are more likely to default on their loans at 1-, 2- and 3-year-ahead horizons. In
particular, the 1-year-ahead default rate is 1 to 2 percentage points higher for non-
executive personnel in downgraded firms. While point estimates are lower for
executive employees, they are not statistically distinguishable from those obtained
for non-executives. These effects increase with the horizon, reaching 5 percentage
points on the 3-year-ahead default rate for auto loans within the same financial
institution, relative to pre-shock means.
Second, we document how banks adjust loan terms offered to workers at down-
graded firms, relative to other workers. A company’s credit rating downgrade
leads to higher interest rates (a 2.5 to 10 percent increase) and lower loan amounts
(an 8 to 20 percent decrease) granted to their employees. This is verified not only
in our baseline specification, but also when considering within-bank variation. If
employees from two firms—one downgraded and the other not—borrow from the
same bank, then this bank will offer worse credit terms to employees of the down-
graded firm, than to employees of the non-downgraded firm, after the downgrade.
We show that these effects occur in a variety consumer credit markets, such as
payroll loans and auto loans, which runs against our findings according to which
the effects we observe are specific to certain types of credit.4 Banks adjust loan
terms to the higher risk of employee default stemming from downgrade, resulting
in greater financial constraints on households.
Third, we use non-interest-bearing credit card balances—which are used solely
as means of payment—to proxy for consumer spending, in an exercise similar to
that in Aydin (2021) and Gross and Souleles (2002). We observe point estimates for
spending ranging from a 5 to 9 percent drop in employees’ spending when their
employer is downgraded.
We augment the usual perspective that firms’ financial frictions affect labor mar-
ket outcomes by adding financial consequences to employees when consuming
and borrowing.5 We examine the consumer finance impact of employer financial
constraints, going beyond the labor effects of corporate financial distress. We add
another mechanism for propagating credit shocks to employees—household credit
4We also document that banks increase loan provisions as a percentage of loan amount to
employees from downgraded firms, suggesting an increase in the expected loss given default.
5Existing studies show that firms’ financial frictions affect their labor demand. See, for instance,
Benmelech et al. (2011), Bai et al. (2018), and Caggese et al. (2019)). Barrot et al. (2018) use import
competition from firms to examine the household debt response from a macroeconomic perspective.
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risk is affected by firm-specific shocks. This implies that banks’ corporate and retail
portfolios are correlated not only through systematic, economy-wide risk but also
through existing employment relationships.
We contribute to the literature that analyzes unemployment, income, and consumer-
worker decisions in credit markets. We do so by collecting an array of data compris-
ing employer ratings, employment characteristics, and employee credit outcomes.
This is a marginal increment to studies that analyze the impact of income shocks
on consumption and credit (e.g. Baker and Yannelis (2017), Baker et al. (2020),
Gelman et al. (2018), and Ganong et al. (2020)). Because we are able to control for
each worker’s current level of income, our estimates reflect employer-driven future
income risk, rather than realized income shocks. Ganong and Noel (2019) provide
evidence that unemployed individuals sharply cut consumption when their un-
employment benefits expire, even though the shock is completely predictable and
non-random. On unemployment and credit, Braxton et al. (2020) show that unem-
ployed individuals try to mitigate the resulting loss of income by borrowing. Our
data allow us to address the change in unemployment risk, instead of a change in
employment status. In our setting, individuals are still employed but they face a
higher latent probability of becoming unemployed.
Micro-level empirical evidence pertaining to labor and credit has become avail-
able only recently following the advent of high computational power and the re-
sulting detailed datasets that are often proprietary and administrative. Guiso et al.
(2005) and Guiso et al. (2013) use Italian administrative data to show that firms
work both as implicit insurers and lenders for their employees. Recent work by
Di Maggio et al. (2020) uses employer-employee matched data in the US to show
that firms provide partial insurance to their workers, but firm-level uncertainty
shocks are passed through, resulting in a lower consumption of durable goods
among low-income workers. Alfaro and Park (2020) identify employers and em-
ployees using online account-aggregator data and measure the impact of firm-level
uncertainty on employee spending.6 Relatedly, Gortmaker et al. (2019) use confi-
dential data from LinkedIn to find that workers in distressed firms also respond to
news about their employers’ creditworthiness by increasing the number of connec-
tions they make through the social network.
6Fonseca and Van Doornik (2019) use confidential administrative data from Brazil and find that
access to credit impacts the skill and experience of hired employees. Cortes et al. (2019) also use
data on lending relationships in Brazil to show that credit risk propagates through firm networks.
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We establish employer-related risk as a source of household credit risk, contribut-
ing to a better understanding of the underlying risks associated with household
balance sheets. Bernstein et al. (2019) compare standard bankruptcy procedures—
liquidation versus reorganization—and observe labor market outcomes in the lo-
calities (blocks, block groups, and tracts) where such events take place. They find
that bankruptcy liquidation reduces employment in apparently unaffected busi-
nesses. Graham et al. (2019) find that, following a corporate bankruptcy filing, em-
ployee’s earnings fall by 10 percent in the same year, with a large cumulative effect
over longer time horizons. Both studies document the labor market consequences
of firm distress. Our work looks at the household credit consequences of such
spillovers, adding to the growing body of literature on household credit outcomes
(e.g. Mian et al. (2010), Mian and Sufi (2016), Adelino et al. (2016), Agarwal et al.
(2017), and Alpanda and Zubairy (2019)). We add to this literature evidence regard-
ing how household credit risk, banking terms, and consumer spending change in
response to employer-related risk.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe
the data and provide institutional background on the Brazilian credit and labor
markets. In Section 2.3 we present our empirical strategy. We report our main
results in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 we test the robustness of our results. In
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background and Data
In the 1980s and 1990s, around 50 percent of bank credit in Brazil was granted by
government-owned banks, with a third of bank branches operating under federal
government banks, including the largest and oldest bank in Brazil, Banco do Brasil.
Even after a series of privatizations of most state-level banks that occurred in early
2000s, government banks still own approximately 45 percent of total bank assets in
Brazil. Both government-owned and private banks are required to report each loan
they grant to the Central Bank.
In 2003, the Brazilian Congress approved a law regulating the legal status of pay-
roll lending. Payroll loans are consumer loans for which the principal and interest
payments are deducted directly from a borrower’s paycheck. By allowing repay-
ment to be executed through automatic payroll deduction, future income becomes
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collateral. Despite the potential resemblance of such loans to payday loans, there
are three substantial differences: (i) interest rates are much lower for payroll loans
than for payday loans in the US; (ii) a consumer can close a bank account to which
payday loan checks are written, which is not possible for payroll loans; and (iii)
payday loans involve balloon payments, with high loss given default, while payroll
loans are mostly installment loans. A detailed analysis of payroll loans and their
effects on credit markets is conducted in Coelho et al. (2012). The ballpark number
for the average default rate in Brazil is 5 percent.
Most of the economic activity in Brazil takes place in the state of São Paulo,
matching what we observe on the number of workers in publicly traded firms per
state, as can be seen in Figure 2.1. Brazil has a relatively well-developed financial
market and its stock exchange—formerly Bovespa, now B3—included 300 to 400
listed companies in the last decade. According to Bloomberg, as of January 2019
there were eight companies with investment-grade ratings in Brazil. The Brazilian
labor market experiences relatively severe frictions because of rigid labor laws,
causing labor decisions to be sticky (Dix-Carneiro et al. (2018), Ulyssea and Ponczek
(2018)). The last two decades saw a steep rise in household debt in emerging
economies (Bahadir and Gumus (2016), Garber et al. (2019), Müller (2018)). In
Brazil, for instance, household indebtedness grew from 35 percent to 55 percent of
total disposable income between 2009 and 2014, and currently accounts for up to
two-thirds of disposable income.
We merge the credit registry maintained by the Central Bank of Brazil with
matched employer-employee data from the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
Our sample period is 2013-2017, which is not only the period in which data on
individuals are the most reliable, but is also the period with the highest number of
workers and industries in listed companies in our database.
Credit registry data are made available by the Brazilian Central Bank, from their
Sistema de Informações de Crédito (SCR). The SCR contains information about the
near-universe of loans above 200 BRL between banks and individuals. Each in-
dividual is tracked using an encrypted identifier linked to their tax identification
number (CPF, Cadastro de Pessoas Físicas). High quality information on the loan
amount, interest rate, bank provision, loan rating, collateral, and amounts past due
is available for each loan. Moreover, the bank’s encrypted tax identifier (CNPJ,






Figure 2.1. Number of Workers employed in Publicly Traded Companies by State: This figure
shows the number of workers employed by publicly-traded firms in Brazil in each state.
tion on all loans above 200 BRL to all individuals working in publicly listed firms.
We retain only non-directed credit to avoid confounding effects from subsidization
though directed funds. We restrict our sample to auto loans, payroll loans, and
credit cards.
Employer-employee data are obtained from Relação Anual de Informações Sociais
(RAIS). RAIS data are collected through mandatory reporting to the Ministry of
Labor and Employment from all the tax-registered firms in Brazil. Every em-
ployee who is formally employed in Brazil is represented in this high-quality and
high-compliance database. Both employers and employees are identified with the
same encryption of tax identifiers described above, allowing the two datasets to be
merged. For each employment relationship we observe: employer and employee
identifiers, salary, contracted hours, tenure, contract status, and employee demo-
graphics including occupation, age, gender, educational attainment, and race. We
restrict the database to full-time workers in publicly listed firms.
Using the employee identifier, we merge both datasets, obtaining a loan-year
panel, with demographics and labor outcomes of the borrower, loan characteristics
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and the exact identification of their employer. We collect data on ratings from
Bloomberg. We select ratings from the three main agencies (S&P, Moody’s and
Fitch) and use them as our measure of credit risk. We restrict our attention to
employees of publicly listed firms for three main reasons: (i) we want firms to
be exposed to credit rating agencies; (ii) information on each firm’s fundamentals
is public; and (iii) it raises external validity of our study, as publicly listed firms
are most similar across developed financial markets. Table 2.1 presents summary
statistics of the dataset in our sample period.
We separate loans by product type and compare loan outcomes and borrower
characteristics in the subset of payroll, auto and interest-bearing credit cards. We
exclude mortgages, acknowledging the preeminence of subsidized mortgages in
Brazil, which invert the normal functioning of credit pricing mechanisms. For
example, a lower income individual is more likely to obtain subsidized credit, so
we observe higher loan amounts and lower interest rates as income declines when
controlling for other observables. As such, we use auto loans as our example of
collateralized consumer credit. The average borrower in our sample has a salary
of 3,810 BRL almost six years at the same company. The white population is over-
represented and the borrower is a woman in only 35 percent of the observations.
A large majority of loans are granted by government-owned banks, most of them
involving credit cards.
As expected, the highest loan amounts are observed in auto loans and the low-
est average amount is observed in credit cards.7 Only auto loans have collateral,
usually the associated vehicle, which explains why the interest rate for these loans
is the lowest. Credit cards carry high rates in Brazil, with an average APR of 76
percent. Borrowers’ demographics are similar across product types, and all the
borrowers are similarly likely to fall into the treatment group. The only sizeable
difference is the higher income of workers who finance their vehicle purchases with
auto loans.









































Figure 2.2. Impact of a Credit Rating Downgrade on Corporate Debt: This figure shows the
effects of a credit rating downgrade on corporate debt financing as measured by net debt divided
by lagged total assets averaged across all downgraded firms. The time window displays one year
before (quarters t ∈ {−4,−3,−2,−1}) and one year after (quarters t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) the date of the
downgrade event (t = 0), which is highlighted by the vertical red line. The figure reflects our
sample, which consists of all corporate downgrades between 2013:Q3 and 2017:Q2. There are 45
downgrade events, involving a total of 24 unique firms.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
Our goal is to estimate the effects of a firm’s credit rating downgrade in its employ-
ees’ credit risk and loan outcomes. We do so by exploiting a source of variation
in employer credit risk that plausibly affects consumer credit risk without being
directly affected by it: credit rating downgrades. It could be the case that credit
ratings do not bind firms’ financial ability to make investment and employment
choices. Figure 2.2 shows that, in the year following a credit rating downgrade,
firms decrease their reliance on credit.
The proposed channel through which firm credit risk becomes employee credit
risk is unemployment risk.. We verify that, after employer credit rating down-
grades, workers are more likely to leave firms, consistent with findings reported
in the literature that focuses on the employee costs of financial distress (Bernstein
et al. (2019), Graham et al. (2019), Baghai et al. (2020)). Figure 2.3 plots event-study
coefficients around downgrades, confirming this intuition.8
8Graphically, we see what could be a pre-trend in labor outcomes, albeit not one that is statis-
tically significant. It is, however, expected given prior evidence that credit ratings are slow-moving
and lag behind firm fundamentals (Löffler (2005); Binici et al. (2018)).
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Figure 2.3. Employment Outcomes for Workers in Downgraded Firms: This figure shows
event-study coefficients of employment outcomes for workers in downgraded firms, estimated
with worker and quarter fixed effects. Observations are monthly and the reference period is one
month before a downgrade.
We use a DID design with multiple downgrade events that can occur in multiple
companies at any moment in time. The treatment group is the set of loan-year ob-
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servations associated with borrowers whose employers were downgraded during
our sample period. The baseline control group comprises all loan-year observations
corresponding to workers in publicly listed firms that were never downgraded dur-
ing the entire sample period. We aim to test hypothesis that an increase in the credit
risk of the employer increases the credit risk of employees and worsens employees’
credit terms.
Our identifying assumption is that changes in loan terms and credit risk in the
control group provide a good counterfactual suggesting what would have hap-
pened in the absence of a credit rating downgrade in the treatment group. In our
within-bank estimation, and with the powerful set of variables we utilize to con-
trol for borrower characteristics and employment details, we mitigate significant
threats to this assumption.
In Figure 2.4 we compare compares characteristics for the treatment and control
groups in the month before a downgrade. Overall, there is no noticeable discrep-
ancy. Tenure and age profiles are very similar. Treated employees have higher
salaries and greater salary heterogeneity. Other than the proportion of female em-
ployees, which is lower for treated employees, there are no sizeable differences in
the proportions of white or college-educated workers.
One concern that might arise is that firm executives exercise considerable con-
trol over both their banking outcomes and their credit risk as well as firm-level
decisions, and hence over their firms’ credit risk. In our main specifications, we
truncate our sample to include only loans belonging to non-executive personnel in
each company. We do so by excluding workers whose earnings are on or above the
95th percentile of earnings in each firm, when we presennt our main results. We
validate this cutoff in Table 2.2, where we list the most predominant occupation
codes among the top 5 percent of earners along with the most predominant occu-
pation codes among the non-executive personnel. We later compare these results
with those including only executives in the treatment and control groups.
Our baseline specification is a generalization of the traditional DID specification
with the following form:
yi, f ,t = αt + βT · Treat f + βDID · DID f ,t + θXi, f ,t + εi, f ,t (2.1)
where yi, f ,t denotes the outcome of loan i for a borrower employed by firm f in
year t. The year fixed effects αt absorb all common time-series variation for both
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Figure 2.4. Comparison of Treatment and Control Groups: Upper panels represent the
distribution of quartiles (Q1, Median and Q3) of continuous variables. In the lower panel, we plot
the means of dummy variables, each of which equals one when each of the categories holds for
each worker, and zero otherwise.
the treatment and control groups. To obtain within-bank estimates, we create an
alternative specification by replacing αt with bank-year fixed effects. Treat f is an in-
dicator that equals one if the borrower’s employer is ever downgraded throughout
our sample period and zero otherwise. Its purpose is to control for time invariant
differences in loan outcomes between treated and control loans. The coefficient
of interest is βDID, which corresponds to the indicator DID f ,t, which equals one
when firm f is treated and year t is the year of the downgrade or any subsequent
year. Xi, f ,t is a set of controls that include age, race, gender, educational attain-
ment, contracted salary, weekly hours, and tenure. βDID measures the conditional
average change (pre- vs. post-downgrade) in the outcomes of borrowers who work
for downgraded firms, relative to the average change for those who do not.
We find a total of 45 non-overlapping downgrades during our sample period,
as indicated in Figure 2.5. Credit rating downgrades are spread widely in the
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Figure 2.5. Time Series of Downgrades: In this figure, we plot counts of credit rating downgrade
events per quarter for our sample period. There is a total of 45 downgrades.
timeseries. The bunching we observe in the first quarter of 2016 occurs as a result
of a sovereign credit downgrade that Brazil experienced in February of that year.
Our outcomes of interest can be divided in three groups: (i) individual loan
terms, including the interest rate and the log-loan amount; (ii) the term-structure
of default, including 1-, 2- and 3-year-ahead indicators of any amount that is past
due for more than 90 days; and (iii) consumer spending, proxied by the balance of
non-interest-bearing credit cards paid in full.
We estimate the equation for each loan type, separately, as they correspond seg-
mented markets with varying magnitudes for loan amounts, rates, maturities, and
credit risk. We cluster standard errors by firm, since the treatment occurs at the
same level, and effects within the same firm are not necessarily independently dis-
tributed.
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Figure 2.6. Main Results for Defaults: This figure shows βDID coefficients as specified in
Equation (2.1), for default rates 1-, 2- and 3-years ahead. A loan is treated in the year its borrower’s
employer suffered a credit rating downgrade and thereafter. Standard errors are clustered by firm.
Confidence intervals of 95 percent are represented around the point estimate. Bank-year fixed
effects absorb all variation between banks in the same year. A tabulated version of these results
can be found in Table 2.3.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Employer Downgrades and Employee Default
We estimate Equation (2.1) with default rates as the dependent variable. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the firm level. Our model controls for differences in
demographics and employment details for each borrower, such as age, gender, ed-
ucation, tenure, contracted salary, and hours. For each loan, in each year, we create
a variable that equals one if there are amounts overdue for more than 90 days, in
the following 1-, 2- or 3-year periods. The idea is that unless the probability of
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Figure 2.7. Main Results for Loan Terms: This figure shows βDID coefficients as specified in
Equation (2.1), for payroll, auto, and credit card loans. A loan is treated in the year its borrower’s
employer suffered a credit rating downgrade and thereafter. Confidence intervals of 95 percent are
represented around the point estimate. The sample comprises loans for non-executive personnel in
publicly listed firms. The complete regression output is reported in Table 2.4.
default on treated loans is higher, it becomes harder to rationalize any changes in
loan terms. Figure 2.6 reports the results.
We focus on within-bank differences in defaults, leaving out differences in de-
fault risk caused by varying risk preferences among banks. We do so by including
bank-year fixed effects. In Panel A we report results for payroll loans, and in Panel
B we report results for auto loans. The first noticeable pattern is that differences in
default rates increase with the time horizon, suggesting some medium/long-term
consequences for employees arising from their employers’ credit risk.
Economically speaking, a differential of 4-5 percentage points in probabilities
of default between treatment and control loans suggests a large spillover effect of
corporate credit risk to their employees. Consistent with employment links playing
a role in employer-employee credit risk propagation, payroll loans exhibit larger
spillover effects.
Employees of distressed firms become riskier, establishing employer credit risk
as a source of household credit risk. These findings reinforce the importance of
considering labor relations as potential transmission channels of credit risk. There-
fore, a banking system should not consider retail and corporate portfolios as two
separate sources of risk that are connected solely through their exposure to credit
risk.
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2.4.2 Employer Downgrades and Employee Loan Terms
We observe that employees of downgraded firms become riskier after the down-
grade, when compared to otherwise similar employees. A natural questions is
whether it causes changes to the terms of credit they obtain. In Figure 2.7, we plot
DID coefficients for the logarithm of loan amount and interest rates as dependent
variables.
In dark blue, we observe that workers in downgraded firms, after a rating down-
grade, experience a 20 percent reduction in their loan amounts and a 2.58 percent-
age point increase in the interest rates of payroll loans relative to employees of
firms that did not receive downgrades. Similar qualitative results are observed for
auto loans, represented in orange: a 7.8 percent reduction in the loan amount and
an almost 1 percentage point higher price of credit. These results are sizeable when
comparing to the means observed in Table 2.1. No significant effects are observed
for credit cards, represented in light blue.
Evidence of the interpretability of our model can be extracted by considering
the coefficients of other covariates associated with creditworthiness through socio-
economic fundamentals, shown in Table 2.4. For instance, white borrowers receive
higher loan amounts with lower interest rates, as do male borrowers. Longer em-
ployment tenure, proxying for job stability, is also related to better credit terms.
These relationships are clear in the point estimates for all loan types.
These results, although qualitatively consistent with a reduction in bank credit
supply, should be interpreted with caution. On the one hand, we are observing
how the equilibrium changes in the credit market, and when the quantity decreases
and the price increases, it is usually the case that there is lower supply. On the other
hand, it could be the case that workers from different firms bank with different
institutions that make different credit-management decisions that could result in
the same outcome. If that is the case, we cannot cleanly establish the interpretation
of a credit-risk spillover.
To address these concerns and obtain a more precise estimate of the spillover
effects, we focus on within-bank variation, by replacing year fixed effects with
bank-year fixed effects.
The coefficients reported in Figure 2.8 alleviate the above mentioned concerns be-
cause both qualitatively and quantitatively, we observe the same pattern: a sharp
drop in the amount of credit supplied for payroll and auto loans, and a sizeable in-
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Figure 2.8. Main Results for Loan Terms, Within-Bank Effects: This figure shows βDID
coefficients as specified in Equation (2.1), for payroll, auto, and credit card loans. A loan is treated
in the year its borrower’s employer suffered a credit rating downgrade and thereafter. Standard
errors are clustered by firm. Confidence intervals of 95 percent are represented around the point
estimate. Bank-year fixed effects absorb all variation between banks in the same year. The sample
comprises loans for non-executive personnel in publicly listed firms. The complete regression
output is reported in Table 2.5.
crease in the interest rate. The absence of a result for credit cards is also confirmed,
and can be attributed to the fact that we observe credit cards only conditional on
origination, while after origination the same credit card in the same bank might
exhibit very similar contractual terms across borrowers.
Focusing on auto and payroll loans, these results are consistent with the idea
that the same bank treats borrowers whose employers suffer credit rating down-
grades as borrowers with higher credit risk. The average reduction in loan amount
after the rating downgrade is 21.2 percent for borrowers in treated firms for payroll
loans, and 6.5 percent for auto loans. Payroll loans also experience higher inter-
est rate sensitivity. This is consistent with the nature of each loan. Payroll loans
are implicitly tied to an employee’s pay, and hence repayment of such a loan is
intrinsically tied to the employee’s employment status.
The smaller, albeit significant effect of auto loans can be rationalized by reference
to two main motives: on the one hand, car payments depend heavily on an average
consumer’s paycheck, so greater uncertainty about paychecks will imply greater
uncertainty about repayment; on the other hand, a bank does not need to adjust
the offered credit terms to the same extent as it would in payroll loans, since there
is a vehicle with liquidation value as collateral.
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Figure 2.9. Main Results for Consumer Spending: This figure shows βDID coefficients as
specified in Equation (2.1), for consumer spending. We proxy for consumer spending, using
non-interest-bearing credit card amounts. A loan is treated in the year its borrower’s employer
suffered a credit rating downgrade and thereafter. Standard errors are clustered by firm.
Confidence intervals of 95 percent are represented around the point estimate. Bank-year fixed
effects absorb all variation between banks in the same year. The complete regression output is
reported in Table 2.6.
2.4.3 Employer Downgrades and Employee Consumption
Understanding the real effects of credit risk transmissions is as important as un-
derstanding the financial dimension of the propagation of corporate credit risk to
employees. Employees of distressed firms will reflect this tighter (current and in-
tertemporal) budget constraint in their real choices, facing more severe financial
constraints in the form of higher interest rates and lower loan amounts. Our ability
to identify non-interest-bearing credit cards allows us to construct a proxy for con-
sumer spending. We measure consumer spending as the balance on credit cards
that do not accrue interest. This means that such credit cards are used solely as
means of payment and are paid in full in the end of each billing cycle, essentially
representing consumption.
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In ??, we report results for consumer spending, using both the baseline specifi-
cation with year fixed effects and the more conservative within-bank specification.
Employees reduce consumer spending following an employer’s credit rating down-
grade. The effect a 9 to 10 percent reduction in consumer spending. These are large
effects, especially for those who have higher marginal utility, as a result of lower
levels of consumption during normal times.
Even though employees in distressed firms reduce their spending levels, they
end up observing a higher increase in defaults than their similar counterparts.
The result that the reduction in spending is insufficient to make ends meet. This
inability to adjust and consequent deterioration of the financial health of these
households, is suggestive of potential long-run consequences.
2.5 Robustness
A natural question is whether the executive personnel in downgraded companies
are equally or at all affected by such an event in consumer credit markets. Two
opposing forces are in play here: it is known that executives’ pay is more sensitive
to performance than that of non-executives, but it is also known that their salaries,
financial literacy, and adjustment capacity are higher. Additionally, executives are
the only one of the two groups who can directly influence or distort credit rating
outcomes.
While the difference between executives and non-executives is interesting, we
also need to rule out the fact that the executive sample yields statistically distin-
guishable estimates than those of our main sample. We exclude executives from
our main results, under the argument that they are responsible for firms decisions
that can generate credit rating downgrades. Focusing on auto and payroll loans,
we estimate the same equation using the sample of executive personnel and report
the results in Figure 2.10.
While we can reject a null effect for non-executives, but we cannot do so for
executives, they are not statistically different from each other. The higher point
estimate for non-executive personnel than for executive personnel is consistent with
the higher ability of executives to manage distressful situations, higher literacy, and
higher wealth.
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Figure 2.10. Robustness - Default Rates for Executives: This figure shows βDID coefficients as
specified in Equation (2.1), for default rates 1-, 2- and 3-years ahead. A loan is treated in the year
its borrower’s employer suffered a credit rating downgrade and thereafter. Standard errors are
clustered by firm. Confidence intervals of 95 percent are represented around the point estimate.
Bank-year fixed effects absorb all variation between banks in the same year. A tabulated version of
these results can be found in Table 2.3.
Our results suggest that the effects are concentrated mainly in payroll loans for
executives, as is the case in our main sample. Effects on payroll loans are of the
same order of magnitude of those in the sample of non-executive personnel. This
suggests that the previously mentioned fact that payroll loans depend directly on
an employer’s ability to pay salaries plays a role in bank decisions, with respect
to both to executive and non-executive borrowers. Auto loans also exhibit similar
magnitudes, however we cannot reject that executives are granted the same credit
at the same price. Our interpretation of that result is that it is unlikely that an
executive would not be able to make her car payment following a downgrade,
and she would likely put up more valuable cars as collateral, regardless of her
employment status.
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Figure 2.11. Robustness - Loan Terms for Executives: This figure shows βDID coefficients as
specified in Equation (2.1), for payroll, auto, and credit card loans. A loan is treated in the year its
borrower’s employer suffered a credit rating downgrade and thereafter. Standard errors are
clustered by firm. Confidence intervals of 95 percent are represented around the point estimate.
Bank-year fixed effects absorb all variation between banks in the same year. The samples are loans
for executive personnel of publicly listed firms, shown in diamonds, and non-executive personnel,
shown in circles. The complete regression output for the executive sample is reported in Table 2.7.
The implications of these results are twofold: for loans that are intrinsically re-
lated to employer’s payroll, all employees are affected by a credit rating down-
grade, obtaining lower loan amounts and more expensive credit from their banks;
for loans determined by a worker’s ability to repay, as is the case with car pay-
ments, and by collateral value, only non-executive personnel experience detectable
effects on loan terms.
Executives experience only a 5 percent reduction in consumer spending, which in
magnitude alone is half of the effect of our main sample. We cannot assert, however,
that there is a statistically significant difference between the effect of executives
and that of non-executives. Our results are robust across employee types, in terms
of magnitude. The lower number of executives in a firm, when compared with
non-executives, leaves us with much less observations in the executive sample.
That produces larger standard errors, increasing the probability that the confidence
interval of our estimates includes zero effects.
2.6 Conclusion
In this study we provide novel evidence of credit-risk spillovers from companies
to their employees. Our credit registry data matched to an employer-employee
dataset allow us to observe not only loan terms, but also employment details and
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Figure 2.12. Robustness - Consumer Spending for Executives: This figure shows βDID
coefficients as specified in Equation (2.1), for consumer spending. We proxy for consumer
spending, using non-interest-bearing credit card amounts. A loan is treated in the year its
borrower’s employer suffered a credit rating downgrade and thereafter. Standard errors are
clustered by firm. Confidence intervals of 95 percent are represented around the point estimate.
Bank-year fixed effects absorb all variation between banks in the same year. The samples are loans
for executive personnel of publicly listed firms, shown in diamonds, and non-executive personnel,
shown in circles. The complete regression output is reported in Table 2.6.
demographics. Our identification strategy uses corporate credit rating downgrades
as a sharp change in an employer’s credit risk, which restricts the company’s access
to credit markets.
We find that credit risk spills over to employees, who become more likely to
default at 1-, 2- and 3-year time horizons. In turn, banks reduce the amount of
credit they can obtain and increasing the interest rates on payroll and auto loans.
The effects are stronger for payroll loans, which are, by nature, more closely tied
to a firm’s ability to make payments, and they are robust between white-collar and
blue-collar workers. Additionally, we show that employees in downgraded firms
and that employees reduce consumption, following an employer’s downgrade.
Our results show that corporate credit risk is tied to consumer credit risk through
labor relationships—unemployment risk—with strong propagation to employees.
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This has implications both for future research and policy-making, as this connec-
tion should be considered. Our estimates of the effects of a downgrade on loan
terms, default incidence, and consumer spending are sizable. The fact that such a
credit rating downgrade is generated in a consumer’s employer, and that its conse-
quences propagate through the banking system, with unequal impacts in already
unequal individuals, deserves further attention in the field of finance.
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2.7 Tables
Payroll Auto Credit Card
Loan Characteristics
  Loan Amount (BRL) 8,827 16,149 2,999
  Interest Rate (p.a.) 29% 22% 76%
  Loan Provision (BRL) 72 84 91
  Collateral Value (BRL) 0 39,881 0
  Loan Rating 8 8 7
  State Bank 77% 89% 78%
Labor Contract 
  Salary (BRL) 3,399 4,246 3,647
  Tenure (months) 81 71 67
  Contracted Hours 42 42 42
Borrower Characteristics
  College Degree 31% 43% 39%
  Female 33% 29% 38%
  Age 39 37 38
  White 60% 64% 57%
  Treat Dummy 12% 10% 10%
  # of Loans 2,685,445 1,974,375 3,180,319
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics by Loan: This table shows loan terms, labor contract
information and borrower characteristics for the full sample of loans. Treatment loan-year
pairs are those whose borrowers’ employers experience credit rating downgrades over the
course of the sample period.
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I (Top 5% Earner) Most Frequent Categories (CBO 2002 Classification)
73 Telecommunication Assemblers/Installers
64 Workers of Agricultural/Forestry Mechanization
78 Vehicle/Machine Operators
86 Power/Water Installation Operators
75 Jewelers, Craftsmen, Glassmakers, Potters
12 Company Directors
13 Directors and Managers, Social Services, Education and Health
61 Agricultural Producers




Table 2.2. Threshold for Executive Personnel: In this table, we report the five most
predominant occupation codes within the top 5 percent of earners of each company
(executive personnel) and within the remaining workers (non-executive personnel), according
to the Brazilian Occupation Classification (CBO 2002).
Non-Exec Executive Non-Exec Executive Non-Exec Executive
DID 0.026 0.001 0.065 0.011 0.059 0.049
(0.011) (0.006) (0.019) (0.012) (0.047) (0.029)
[0.016] [0.834] [0.001] [0.348] [0.205] [0.090]
Fixed-Effects Bank-Year Bank-Year Bank-Year Bank-Year Bank-Year Bank-Year
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan-Years 2,033,076 82,482 1,288,198 49,022 793,290 27,685
Adjusted R2 0.048 0.035 0.195 0.187 0.362 0.366
Non-Exec Executive Non-Exec Executive Non-Exec Executive
DID 0.013 0.000 0.040 0.010 0.050 0.050
(0.006) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011) (0.034) (0.027)
[0.023] [0.915] [0.003] [0.405] [0.135] [0.067]
Fixed-Effects Bank-Year Bank-Year Bank-Year Bank-Year Bank-Year Bank-Year
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan-Years 1,242,269 95,376 661,640 44,750 330,696 19,413
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.047 0.194 0.174 0.333 0.324
1-Year Ahead 2-Years Ahead 3-Years Ahead
Panel A: Payroll Loans
1-Year Ahead 2-Years Ahead 3-Years Ahead
Panel B: Auto Loans
Table 2.3. Main Results for Default: This table shows regression results for payroll, auto,
and credit card loans in a difference-in-differences setting. A loan is treated in the year its
borrower’s employer suffered a credit rating downgrade and thereafter. Standard errors
are clustered by firm. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are
reported in brackets. Bank-year fixed effects absorb all variation between banks in the
same year. The sample comprises loans for executive personnel in publicly listed firms.
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Loan Amount Interest Rate Loan Amount Interest Rate Loan Amount Interest Rate
DID -0.209 2.579 -0.078 0.960 0.023 3.606
(0.046) (1.031) (0.035) (0.306) (0.044) (3.697)
[0.000] [0.013] [0.028] [0.002] [0.606] [0.330]
Treat 0.146 -2.915 -0.084 0.163 -0.227 6.563
(0.138) (1.655) (0.061) (0.569) (0.080) 4-603
[0.292] [0.079] [0.169] [0.776] [0.005] [0.154]
College Degree 0.613 -1.129 0.259 -4.136 0.475 -14.807
(0.170) (0.681) (0.058) (0.309) (0.084) (1.703)
[0.000] [0.098] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.000]
White 0.175 -0.566 0.054 -1.468 0.118 -6.424
(0.038) (0.584) (0.013) (0.160) (0.021) (1.149)
[0.000] [0.333] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age 0.007 -0.055 -0.001 -0.045 0.005 -0.033
(0.003) (0.017) (0.002) (0.021) (0.003) (0.211)
[0.006] [0.002] [0.501] [0.029] [0.111] [0.875]
Female -0.001 0.030 0.069 -0.654 0.115 -3.046
(0.056) (0.674) (0.022) (0.164) (0.024) (1.275)
[0.992] [0.965] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.017]
Employment Tenure 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.054
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.017)
[0.820] [0.039] [0.069] [0.142] [0.738] [0.002]
Contracted Hours -0.041 0.235 -0.023 0.289 -0.028 0.993
(0.006) (0.103) (0.003) (0.049) (0.005) (0.401)
[0.000] [0.023] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.014]
Salary (BRL) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.000] [0.019] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Fixed-Effects Year Year Year Year Year Year
Loan-Years 2,570,755 2,570,755 1,820,949 1,820,949 2,985,416 2,985,416
Adjusted R2 0.267 0.055 0.088 0.168 0.140 0.058
Interest-Bearing Credit CardPayroll Auto
Table 2.4. Main Results for Loan Terms: This table shows regression results for payroll,
auto, and credit card loans, in a difference-in-differences setting. A loan is treated in the
year its borrower’s employer suffered a credit rating downgrade and thereafter. Standard
errors are clustered by firm. Standard errors are in reported parentheses and p-values are
reported in brackets. The sample comprises loans for non-executive personnel in publicly
listed firms.
66
Loan Amount Interest Rate Loan Amount Interest Rate Loan Amount Interest Rate
DID -0.212 1.615 -0.065 0.733 0.007 -2.336
(0.096) (1.038) (0.032) (0.207) (0.033) (4.454)
[0.028] [0.120] [0.039] [0.001] [0.843] [0.600]
Treat 0.145 -2.047 -0.084 0.110 -0.159 11.941
(0.145) (1.202) (0.050) (0.391) (0.082) (4.574)
[0.416] [0.089] [0.097] [0.779] [0.052] [0.010]
College Degree 0.477 -2.971 0.228 -3.177 0.440 -13.338
(0.092) (0.791) (0.059) (0.250) (0.060) (1.636)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
White 0.089 -0.385 0.042 -1.200 0.120 -8.166
(0.013) (0.243) (0.012) (0.111) (0.021) (1.122)
[0.000] [0.114] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age 0.005 -0.075 -0.002 -0.042 0.004 -0.249
(0.002) (0.017) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.136)
[0.007] [0.000] [0.186] [0.000] [0.057] [0.069]
Female 0.010 -0.343 0.072 -0.640 0.082 -0.289
(0.032) (0.267) (0.020) (0.126) (0.017) (0.832)
[0.751] [0.199] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.729]
Employment Tenure 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.044
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.014)
[0.460] [0.000] [0.037] [0.266] [0.799] [0.002]
Contracted Hours -0.029 0.305 -0.018 0.208 -0.028 0.944
(0.004) (0.049) (0.003) (0.029) (0.004) (0.352)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.008]
Salary (BRL) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Fixed-Effects Bank-Year Bank-Year Bank-Year Bank-Year Bank-Year Bank-Year
Loan-Years 2,570,755 2,570,755 1,820,949 1,820,949 2,985,416 2,985,416
Adjusted R2 0.347 0.302 0.119 0.292 0.189 0.205
Payroll Auto Interest-Bearing Credit Card
Table 2.5. Main Results for Loan Terms, Within-Bank Effects: This table shows regression results for payroll, auto, and credit
card loans, in a difference-in-differences setting. A loan is treated in the year its borrower’s employer suffered a credit rating
downgrade and thereafter. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are
reported in brackets. The sample comprises loans for non-executive personnel in publicly listed firms.
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DID -0.098 -0.089 -0.045 -0.054
(0.029) (0.030) (0.044) (0.039)
[0.001] [0.004] [0.310] [0.163]
Treat -0.057 -0.026 0.073 0.060
(0.070) (0.075) (0.114) (0.115)
[0.413] [0.724] [0.523] [0.600]
College Degree 0.509 0.488 0.301 0.276
(0.063) (0.045) (0.037) (0.031)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
White 0.152 0.154 0.122 0.120
(0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
[0.010] [0.002] [0.087] [0.027]
Female 0.075 0.060 0.023 0.016
(0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016)
[0.001] [0.002] [0.231] [0.300]
Employment Tenure 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.477] [0.271] [0.013] [0.004]
Contracted Hours -0.021 -0.022 -0.027 -0.024
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.010] [0.000]
Salary (BRL) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Fixed-Effects Year Bank-Year Year Bank-Year
Loan-Years 4,056,323 4,056,323 449,272 449,272
Adjusted R2 0.194 0.218 0.128 0.155
Non-Interest Bearing Credit Cards Utilization (Consumption)
Non-Executives Executives
Table 2.6. Main Results for Consumption: This table shows regression results for
consumption in a difference-in-differences setting. We proxy for consumption using
non-interest-bearing credit card amounts. A loan is treated in the year its borrower’s
employer suffered a credit rating downgrade and thereafter. Standard errors are clustered
by firm. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in
brackets. Bank-year fixed effects absorb all variation between banks in the same year.
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DID -0.198 -0.234 2.307 1.415 -0.043 -0.033 0.697 0.546
(0.073) (0.076) (0.696) (0.823) (0.060) (0.059) (0.631) (0.454)
[0.007] [0.003] [0.001] [0.086] [0.477] [0.580] [0.269] [0.229]
Treat 0.124 0.202 -1.294 0.016 -0.081 -0.077 -0.019 0.086
(0.097) (0.116) (1.947) (1.457) (0.096) (0.079) (0.407) (0.384)
[0.202] [0.082] [0.507] [0.991] [0.401] [0.332] [0.963] [0.823]
College Degree 0.190 0.185 -1.492 -1.087 0.009 -0.006 -3.118 -2.413
(0.059) (0.048) (0.641) (0.436) (0.030) (0.027) (0.194) (0.155)
[0.002] [0.000] [0.020] [0.013] [0.758] [0.812] [0.000] [0.000]
White 0.144 0.079 -0.876 -0.530 0.007 0.008 -1.337 -1.068
(0.032) (0.023) (0.634) (0.244) (0.021) (0.020) (0.126) (0.104)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.168] [0.031] [0.754] [0.683] [0.000] [0.000]
Age 0.006 0.005 -0.096 -0.109 -0.004 -0.005 -0.051 -0.042
(0.002) (0.002) (0.033) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.007)
[0.008] [0.003] [0.004] [0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Female -0.004 -0.008 1.293 0.011 -0.013 -0.001 -0.743 -0.596
(0.035) (0.028) (0.508) (0.232) (0.018) (0.015) (0.141) (0.110)
[0.909] [0.778] [0.011] [0.962] [0.475] [0.961] [0.000] [0.000]
Employment Tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.073] [0.005] [0.003] [0.000] [0.053] [0.280]
Contracted Hours -0.023 -0.019 0.242 0.254 -0.022 -0.017 0.103 0.078
(0.007) (0.006) (0.135) (0.066) (0.010) (0.005) (0.035) (0.029)
[0.002] [0.001] [0.075] [0.000] [0.023] [0.001] [0.004] [0.007]
Salary (BRL) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.039] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Fixed-Effects Year Bank-Year Year Bank-Year Year Bank-Year Year Bank-Year
Loan-Years 111,212 111,212 111,212 111,212 152,050 152,050 152,050 152,050
Adjusted R2 0.199 0.263 0.087 0.370 0.048 0.074 0.108 0.274
Loan Amount Interest Rate
Payroll Auto Loans
Loan Amount Interest Rate
Table 2.7. Main Results for Loan Terms, Executive Personnel: This table shows regression results for payroll, auto, and credit
card loans in a difference-in-differences setting. A loan is treated in the year its borrower’s employer suffered a credit rating
downgrade and thereafter. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are
reported in brackets. Bank-year fixed effects absorb all variation between banks in the same year. The sample comprises loans
for executive personnel in publicly listed firms.
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